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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the growth, employment, and poverty record of The Gambia focusing on 
the macroeconomic environment and the structure and functioning of labour markets. Its aim 
is to identify areas where current policies can be improved or where more knowledge needs to 
be generated to better inform inclusive development strategies. The growth pattern of The 
Gambia does not appear to be pro-poor, as improvements in the rate of growth appear to 
have at best halted the spread of poverty. Weak productivity performance and the low quality 
of employment help explain the poverty record. On the macroeconomic side, an excessive 
emphasis on inflation reduction and reliance on monetary policy instruments that have  
helped sustain a high-interest rate environment, which discourages investment and 
employment creation. As part of an alternative policy package, The Gambia could reformulate 
macroeconomic policies to target growth instead of inflation, select a more effective mix of 
policy instruments, and pursue financial reforms to increase the supply of credit to the 
economy and particularly to employment-intensive activities. In addition, targeted public 
investments are essential for sustaining more rapid growth and improvements in employment 
opportunities. A review of the available evidence suggests that labour markets in The Gambia 
do not function in a way conducive to poverty reduction. The employment situation conforms 
to the typical configuration, whereby traditional activities and informality dominate rural and 
urban areas. The Gambia also faces high open unemployment rates in cities, particularly 
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among the youth. Measures to increase the labour mobility of the poor are urgently needed. 
The Gambia has benefited from a rapid increase in literacy and basic education, although  
more progress is needed to improve the quality of education and, particularly, to provide 
comprehensive training that adequately meets the demand for skilled labour. Finally, there is 
an urgent need to overhaul labour institutions with the aim of improving labour conditions, 
reducing labour segmentation and improving knowledge systems. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Reducing poverty in The Gambia remains a formidable challenge. Although growth has 
improved in recent years, the available evidence suggests that better economic performance  
has not translated into poverty reduction. The second poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP II) 
recognizes the disjuncture between the country’s record on economic growth and progress in 
reducing poverty:  
“… since 1994 when The Gambia launched its first strategy for poverty alleviation (SPA I), poverty 
reduction continues to be evasive with the proportion of people living in poverty rising. Also poverty 
studies conducted in 1998 and 2003 indicate that in addition to increase in the prevalence and severity 
of poverty, inequality is also on the increase.” (Republic of The Gambia, 2006, p. 24). 
 
Strong economic growth is necessary, but not sufficient, for sustainable poverty 
reduction. In order for poverty reduction strategies to be successful, the poor must share  
in the benefits of growth. 
Most Gambians depend on employment for their primary source of income. Moreover, 
the productive resource which poor households command in abundance is their own labour. 
Therefore, improving employment opportunities and raising the returns to labour can lead to 
poverty reduction and progress towards meeting broader human development objectives, 
such as those reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
Simply having access to employment is not sufficient. Many employed Gambians  
do not earn enough to lift their families out of poverty. Therefore, reducing poverty requires 
a joint emphasis on the quality and quantity of employment. Research shows that the 
greater the employment focus, the more effective economic growth becomes in fighting 
poverty (Khan, 2006). Economic growth alone can not be counted on to generate significant 
improvements in the quality and quantity of employment opportunities (Osmani, 2006). 
What is needed is an employment-centred approach to growth and development, one  
that emphasizes the creation of economic opportunities that the poor can access and that 
provide a return to their labour sufficient for raising households out of poverty. 
This suggests that rapid and sustained reduction of poverty in The Gambia require  
the confluence of three factors: sustainable growth at high levels, the improvement of 
employment opportunities, and greater access to jobs for the poor (Osmani, 2006). The 
Gambia Priority Employment Programme, known as GAMJOBS (Government of Gambia  
2006) recognizes the need to orient development strategies towards the provision of decent 
livelihoods and supplies a framework for implementing the National Employment Policy (NEP) 
and Action Plan (NEAP) formulated by the Government of Gambia (2001). This paper, in the 
spirit of these existing initiatives, examines policies which would support an employment-
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centred, and thereby poverty-reducing, growth path for The Gambia that could distribute  
the benefits of the country’s improved economic performance more broadly. 
In the past, The Gambia has suffered from poor economic performance which has 
contributed to high and, by some indicators, rising levels of poverty. From the mid-1980s to 
the end of the 1990s, estimates of long-run per capita growth have been negative on average 
(Figure 1). Over the past several years, economic performance has improved. However, high 
levels of sustained growth for many years into the future are required to overcome the legacy 
of a decade and a half of regressive economic performance. 
FIGURE 1 
Growth of Per Capita GDP, The Gambia 1970-2005 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2006. Central Bank of The Gambia. 
Note: The long-run trend was derived by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the annual per capita growth rate. 
 
As mentioned above, we need to be concerned with both the quality and quantity of 
employment. The level of labour productivity determines the prevailing returns to labour and 
the income which employment generates. Therefore, in the long-run, the scope for sustainable 
improvements in the average quality of employment will be circumscribed by The Gambia’s 
productivity performance. Labour productivity trends are difficult to trace due to a lack of 
reliable employment data over time. However, we can examine labour productivity trends 
under two scenarios which make different assumptions about the level of unemployment.1  
If we first make the simplifying assumption that unemployment rates remained constant 
throughout the period between 1990 and 2005, aggregate labour productivity would have fallen 
on average during these years. Assuming instead a rising trend in unemployment from 5 per cent 
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to 10 per cent, there would have been a modest upward trend in aggregate labour productivity. 
These stylized examples suggest that economic performance has not been strong enough to 
both absorb new entrants into the labour force and raise average productivity.   
Approximately half of all employment in The Gambia is found in the agricultural sector, 
even though agriculture accounts for just 31 per cent of GDP.2 Therefore, in terms of 
household livelihoods and living standards, agriculture is critically important. Trends in 
agricultural value-added per worker indicate that agricultural productivity began to decline  
in the early 1980s in absolute terms (see appendix). Despite the negative shock in 2002,  
there is evidence of a partial recovery in agricultural productivity after 1998. Nevertheless, 
the estimated value added per worker in agriculture currently remains below the level that 
prevailed during much of the 1970s. Stagnant productivity growth in agricultural activities 
limits earnings from agriculture and constrains sustainable improvements in rural living 
standards. If the trends discussed here represent an accurate picture of the dynamics of 
agricultural productivity, they suggest that The Gambia’s rural population would not have 
shared in the benefits generated through the recent improvement in economic growth.  
The Gambia appears to have reached a turning point with higher rates of growth 
representing a departure from the years of economic stagnation. Nevertheless, long-run 
growth rates appear to be insufficient to both raise labour productivity and to provide 
opportunities to a growing workforce—sustained rapid growth is needed. In addition, steps 
must be taken to insure that economic growth creates improved employment opportunities. 
The challenge is to sustain the momentum of the past few years of rapid growth and to 
accelerate the pace of improvements so as to promote better employment as a foundation  
for human development and poverty reduction. The right policy environment is essential to 
achieve this goal. 
This paper examines two aspects of the Gambian economy that must be taken into 
account in any strategy aimed at fostering inclusive, employment-centred growth: (1) 
macroeconomic policies and performance and (2) the structure of employment, the labour 
force, and existing labour market policies. The goal is to identify areas where poverty-reducing 
employment policies can be improved or areas where more knowledge needs to be generated 
to better inform inclusive development policies.  
We emphasize macroeconomic management because it encompasses a set of policy 
instruments that are crucial for creating an environment conducive to the improvement of 
employment opportunities. Macroeconomic policies represent a subset of what are often 
called “horizontal policies”—i.e. broad-based initiatives that aim to improve economic 
performance but are not targeted at specific sectors or activities. This is not to suggest that 
targeted policies (“vertical policies”)—e.g. to promote tourism, encourage horticultural 
exports, reduce the volatility of groundnut production, etc.—have no role to play in an 
employment-centred development strategy. However, such productive sector policies have 
been discussed at length elsewhere (e.g. in the PRSP II) and are not a focus of this paper.3 
As discussed earlier, it is not enough to create new employment—the poor must be  
able to take advantage of these opportunities as they arise. Barriers to economic mobility  
may prevent an employment-focused policy of being sufficiently “pro-poor.” We need to 
understand the structure of employment, the characteristics of the labour force, and the 
functioning of labour markets to identify possible constraints to labour mobility and factors 
which keep average returns to labour low. Therefore, the second section of this paper focuses 
on these issues. 
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Although the paper discusses macroeconomic and labour market policies to support the 
improvement of employment opportunities in The Gambia, it is not meant to represent a fully 
articulated employment strategy for the country. Instead, our aim is a modest one—to identify 
critical issues and policy areas that would need to be addressed in a national employment 
strategy. In this regard, this paper could feed into discussions for developing a comprehensive 
approach to ‘pro-poor’ employment policies in The Gambia. 
The analysis in this paper was informed by interviews with policy makers, government 
officials, private sector representatives, researchers, and civil society groupings which were 
undertaken in a week-long field visit to Banjul in 2007. In addition, the research team reviewed 
policy documents and conducted an independent analysis of available macroeconomic, 
poverty and employment data. The findings of the fieldwork and the data analysis form the 
basis of the policy discussions and recommendations contained in this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the economic performance of  
The Gambia and discusses the major macroeconomic policies shaping it. Section III discusses 
poverty, labour markets and the structure of employment, covering a variety of issues ranging 
from the links between poverty and employment, the main characteristics of unemployment, 
and under-employment. The section also discusses the peculiarities of the supply and demand 
for labour, including labour skills, migration and labour institutions. Section IV offers concluding 
remarks and policy recommendations for employment creation and poverty reduction. 
2  MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES 
We have already discussed The Gambia’s growth record over the past few decades (Figure 1). 
During this period, the growth rate of per capita income has been subject to wide fluctuations 
that continue to the present day. Because of the volatility of economic growth, it is helpful to 
estimate a long-run growth trend in order to assess the underlying economic trajectory hidden 
by short-run fluctuations. The long-run trend reveals reasonably strong economic performance 
in the early 1970s. However, beginning in the mid-1970s, The Gambia entered a period of 
declining growth rates for nearly two decades and, as we have already discussed, long-run 
growth was negative for many years during this period of stagnation. Economic performance 
reached a low point in the early 1990s, which were years of heightened political uncertainty, 
including the 1994 coup d’état.4 Over the past 10 years, there is evidence of a turn-around 
despite the dramatic drop in economic growth in 2002, when groundnut production fell 
significantly due to crop failure. Currently, long-run growth rates are among the highest in 
The Gambia’s post-independence history. 
Estimates of gross investment in fixed capital suggest that productive investment has 
remained steady as a share of GDP during the past two decades (Figure 2). Gross investment  
as a per cent of GDP has hovered around 20 per cent during much of this period. Interestingly, 
investment as a share of GDP does not show an upward trend during the past 10 years despite 
the noticeable improvement in the long-run per capita GDP growth rate. Therefore, 
improvements in GDP growth were not driven by higher rates of fixed capital investment. 
Estimates of the level of domestic savings almost always fall significantly below the level  
of domestic investment. This indicates that, throughout its post-independence history, 
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The Gambia has relied on foreign savings to support its domestic investment. Although the 
saving gap appears to have narrowed somewhat in recent years, capital accumulation  
in the country continues to depend on foreign savings. 
FIGURE 2 
Gross Domestic Savings and Investment as Per Cent of GDP, The Gambia 1970-2004 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2006. 
 
The Gambian economy relies on foreign resources—foreign savings to finance domestic 
investment, imported capital goods, external borrowing, and official development assistance 
(ODA). Managing the external balance of payments is therefore central to overall economic 
performance. Figure 3 presents official data on The Gambia’s current account balance in 2001 
and 2005. The Gambia has a pronounced current account deficit which is partially off-set by 
ODA transfers. The current account deficit appears to be structural—that is, it persists over 
time and is not caused by short-term movements in inflows and outflows.5 One contributing 
factor is The Gambia’s reliance on imported commodities and the absence of strong export 
performance, creating a structural trade deficit. Both the trade deficit and the current account 
deficit increased significantly from 2001 to 2005. However, a large portion of this increase is 
most likely temporary. The Gambia received unprecedented inflows of foreign direct 
investment which were accompanied by large increases in imports in 2004 and 2005  
(e.g., building materials for investment in new foreign owned hotels). In this case, the growth 
in the current account deficit was financed by FDI inflows rather than greater borrowing. 
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FIGURE 3 
Current Account and Trade Deficits as Per Cent of GDP, The Gambia 
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Source: Central Bank of The  Gambia. 
 
The trends and patterns highlighted here are not meant to provide a comprehensive 
picture of The Gambia’s macroeconomic situation. Instead, they provide a backdrop to more 
in-depth discussions of three areas of macroeconomic policy: monetary policies, exchange rate 
management, and fiscal policies. As already pointed out, there are indications that economic 
performance has been improving in recent times: per capita growth is higher, agricultural 
productivity shows signs of recovery, and foreign direct investment—not simply debt and 
ODA—has supplied much needed external financial resources. However, the Gambian 
economy is volatile and gains may disappear as quickly as they are realized. Therefore, 
macroeconomic policies must support sustainable development in The Gambia if long-term 
benefits are to be realized. 
MONETARY POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
According to the 2006-2010 Strategic Plan of the Central Bank of The Gambia, two of the primary 
goals of monetary policy are to maintain stability in the domestic price level and the value of 
the Dalasi. Specifically, the current medium-term macroeconomic framework (2005-2008) 
targets inflation rates between 3-5 per cent. The PRSP II presents projections of future inflation 
rates from 2007 to 2011 that fall within or, in the example of a more optimistic macroeconomic 
scenario, below this range (Republic of The Gambia, 2006, Tables 17A and 17B). The Central 
Bank formulates monetary policy with the ultimate objective of keeping inflation in the lower 
single digits. Its intermediate target for daily operations is the control of the growth rate of the 
money supply. Specifically, the Central Bank’s monetary policy targets the growth rate of 
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broad money. In order to influence the growth rate of broad money, the Central Bank aims  
to control the growth rate of a narrower monetary category denominated as “high-powered 
money,” “narrow money,” or M1 (where M1 consists of reserves in the banking system plus 
currency in circulation). 
The Central Bank influences the growth rate of M1 through open market operations—
buying and selling short-term government treasury bills. Such open market operations impact 
interest rates on short-term government securities. For example, in order to reduce the growth 
rate of M1, the Central Bank sells treasury bills. In order to encourage the banking sector to 
hold the additional treasury bills, the yield on treasury bills would need to rise. In addition, the 
growth of monetary aggregates—such as M1 or broad money—is assumed to have a direct 
impact on the domestic price level. Therefore, by controlling the growth of monetary 
aggregates, the Central Bank aims to achieve price stability. In practice, the Central Bank 
establishes a growth rate for reserve money that it deems consistent with low inflation, with 
the idea that this reserve money target will in turn lead to a growth rate of broad money that is 
consistent with low inflation and adequate liquidity in the private sector. 
The relationship between M1 and broader categories of money supply is frequently 
imperfect. If individuals shift their financial assets out of the banking system in order to invest 
in other types of assets (e.g., real estate, capital markets), broad money may decline even if M1 
is stable or increasing (see Pollin, Githinji, and Heintz, 2008 for an example of this in the case of 
Kenya). Much depends on the availability of stable financial assets that are substitutes for bank 
holdings. Despite this possibility, in The Gambia, the relationship between the growth of M1 
and the growth of broad money is quite close. Figure 4 charts the growth rate of the two 
monetary aggregates. From the figure, it is clear that both types of money move together.6  
As the financial sector develops and a more diverse array of financial assets becomes available, 
this tight relationship may deteriorate. If the link between reserve money and broad money 
supply were weakened, a new approach to monetary policy, with different short-run targets, 
would be warranted.  
The current close relationship between the growth rate of M1 and broad money indicates 
that the Central Bank’s approach to influencing the growth of the broad money supply by 
targeting M1 growth may still be reasonable, given the level of financial development in  
The Gambia. However, the relationship between the growth rate of broad money and the 
inflation rate, as measured by the per cent change in the consumer price index, is weaker. 
Figure 5 shows the growth rate of broad money and the inflation rate for The Gambia from 
1971 to 2005. In general, there is no evidence of a clear, stable relationship between the 
growth of broad money and inflationary dynamics in The Gambia—at least in the range of 
values evident in the country’s recent history.7 The relationship between broad money and 
inflation appears to have been tightest in the 1980s to the early 1990s. Specifically, there 
appears to be evidence that higher money supply growth rates are associated with higher 
future inflation rates. However, in the 1970s and from 1994 to the present, the relationship is 
much less clear, even taking into account the lagged impact of money supply growth on 
inflation. Although the Central Bank appears to be able to influence monetary aggregates 
through its policy tools, these same tools may be of limited use in controlling inflation, giventhe 
nature of price dynamics in the country. In particular, contractionary monetary policy may  
not be effective at maintaining inflation rates in the low single digits, even though very rapid 
expansions of the money supply have been associated with higher rates of inflation, particularly 
in the mid-1980s. 
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FIGURE 4 
Growth Rates of High Powered Money (M1) and Broad Money, The Gambia, 1971-2006 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Inflation and the Growth of Broad Money, The Gambia, 1971-2005 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
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The source of inflationary pressures in The Gambia explains the relatively weak 
relationship between the growth of monetary aggregates and the rate of inflation. In many 
cases, inflationary pressures come from supply-shocks that affect key prices, such as food and 
energy. For example, in the Monetary Policy Committee Press Release of the Central Bank of 
The Gambia issued in June 29, 2007, the Committee acknowledges that recent inflationary 
pressures are partly a result of increases in food prices. However, monetary aggregates 
influence the domestic price level through demand-side effects on purchasing power.  
If inflationary pressures originate from supply-side shocks, changes in the growth rate  
of broad money will have a limited impact on inflation dynamics. 
Moreover, reducing the growth rate of broad money in the face of supply-side inflation 
can worsen the overall economic situation. Inflationary supply-side shocks often have a 
negative impact on real economic growth. Therefore, reducing liquidity and raising interest 
rates may discourage economic growth exactly when it would be beneficial for the Central 
Bank to offset the negative supply-side shock through a more relaxed monetary stance.  
In other words, the reduction in liquidity during an economic downturn may worsen  
growth performance instead of reigning in inflationary pressures.   
Inflation rates in The Gambia have not been excessive over the past several decades, 
although they frequently exceeded the 3-5 per cent range currently targeted (Figure 5).  
With the exception of a rapid, albeit short-lived, increase in inflation in the mid-1980s, when 
the exchange rate depreciated significantly, measured inflation has rarely edged above 20  
per cent. From the 1990s to the present, inflation has tended to remain in the single digits. 
Several research studies suggest that inflation rates within this range (e.g. up to 12-15 per cent) 
are consistent with long-run economic growth (Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Pollin and Zhu, 2006). 
Unlike many other developing countries that experienced episodes of hyper-inflation, The 
Gambia has generally enjoyed a climate of relative price stability. 
One of the costs of pursuing a tight, low-inflation monetary policy is that real interest 
rates would need to increase, thereby reducing investment and consumer spending. 
Therefore, maintaining very low rates of inflation may entail large costs and relatively few 
benefits. Figure 6 shows nominal and real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) interest rates on short term 
treasury bills. Real interest rates are markedly high in The Gambia. There is evidence of some 
downward movement in real interest rates in 2000-2001 but this trend has since reversed 
itself. The inflation rate increased after the 2002 supply-side economic crisis and this was 
accompanied by a rise in real treasury bill rates—an example of tight monetary policy 
accompanying a negative real economy shock. Such high interest rates make credit 
prohibitively expensive to support the expansion and improvement of many small-scale, 
labour-intensive activities. Under these circumstances, an alternative approach to monetary 
policy—one that targets short-term interest rates at a level consistent with long-run economic 
growth—would be desirable. 
Not only are real lending rates high in The Gambia, the spread between deposit and 
lending rates is wide and has been increasing in recent years. Figure 7 illustrates the spread 
(i.e., the difference) between the lending interest rate and the deposit interest from 1978 to 
2006. Several factors contribute to the large spread between deposit and lending rates. 
Concentration in the domestic banking sector and weak competitive pressures may yield high 
lending rates and low deposit rates due to monopolistic pricing practices. In addition, a high 
risk premium will raise average lending rates for borrowers. High risk premiums are frequently 
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the result of a variety of problems, such as: excessive economic volatility, lack of good 
information systems on potential borrowers, inaccurate assessments of lending risk by  
formal financial institutions, and weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  
FIGURE 6 
Treasury Bill Rates, Nominal and Real, Gambia 1996-2006 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
 
FIGURE 7 
Spread Between Lending Rates and Deposit Rates, Gambia 1978-2006 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
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The large spreads evident in The Gambia are the result of institutional constraints in the 
financial sector. The existence of large risk premiums and the high real interest rates on 
treasury bills creates a situation in which resources are available in the banking sector to 
extend credit to private sector activities, yet such loans are not made available. The reason is 
straight-forward: given the choice between holding government securities with high, relatively 
risk-free rates of return or extending risky loans to private sector producers, incurring the 
associated transactions costs, the banking sector tends to hold treasury bills. Figure 8 shows 
the average asset portfolio of the banking sector in The Gambia during 2006/7. The banking 
sector holds nearly an equivalent amount of treasury bills as it extends in loans to the private 
sector. In other words, the banking sector currently has resources to nearly double its current 
levels of lending to support domestic investment, which could be targeted at employment-
intensive activities. 
FIGURE 8 
Assets of Deposit Money Banks, Gambia (Average May 2006-April 2007), Millions of Dalasis 
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Source: Central Bank of The  Gambia. 
 
This discussion raises an important issue: whether the effectiveness of monetary policies 
may be constrained by institutional factors. If the banking sector does not extend credit to 
appropriate sectors, then an expansionary monetary policy may not have the desired effect  
in the absence of financial sector reform. By financial sector reform we mean changes to  
the regulatory and institutional environment in which banks operate which would more 
effectively mobilize scarce financial resources for development. Similarly, monetary policy 
operating in isolation will not be able to manage inflation constructively if price dynamics are 
driven by supply-side factors. Other policy tools—such as, investments in efficiency-enhancing 
transport and storage infrastructure—are frequently more important for addressing adverse 
supply-side price shocks. Similarly, government-initiated programmes to improve 
creditworthiness by developing better business planning, financial management and book-
keeping skills have a role to play.  
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Therefore, the appropriate monetary policy for The Gambia is conditional on the other 
economic reforms that are undertaken. The current monetary policy framework—targeting 
monetary aggregates to reduce inflation to the low single digits—may be operational in the 
current institutional context. However, the current framework will not realize the potential of 
less restrictive monetary policies administered within the context of a broader development 
strategy that strives to relax core structural and institutional constraints. In addition, the 
improved rates of growth which The Gambia has realized in the recent past may not be 
sustainable because they depend on foreign savings and current policies inhibit the 
mobilization of domestic sources of investment. Only by improving domestic investment 
would a sustainable foundation be created to maintain the country’s improved growth 
performance in the long run. Without coordination across policy areas, the scope of 
macroeconomic policy will be limited to stabilization and will not be extended to supporting 
sustainable development. 
Specifically, steps could be taken to improve the amount of credit directed towards 
employment-intensive activities. As mentioned previously, employment in The Gambia is 
concentrated in agricultural and informal activities. But substantial risk premiums, information 
problems, high transactions costs, and a lack of incentives within the banking sector limit 
credit availability. Moreover, growth in some activities in the formal sector, such as tourism 
development, may also provide new employment opportunities. Policies can be implemented 
to improve credit access in priority areas. Public loan guarantees can reduce risk premiums; 
information systems can be improved, lowering transactions costs; and incentives can be put 
in place to encourage banks to shift away from short-term government securities and towards 
developmental loans. Not only would such interventions improve credit availability, they 
would also enhance the ability of monetary policy to support development objectives. 
In addition, links can be forged between the commercial banking sector and other 
financial institutions which are able to service small-scale and own-account producers. 
Commercial banks are often well-situated to mobilize deposits and other financial resources 
but they may not be efficient at administering small-scale credit programs. Other tiers of the 
financial sector are better situated to serve this population. For example, in 2006, VISACA 
(Village Savings and Credit Associations) and credit unions served over 66,000 clients and 
extended over D93 million in loans.8 By building stronger links between the various tiers of  
The Gambia’s financial system, resources could be deployed more successfully to accelerate 
private sector development. 
Development finance policies need not be limited to efforts to get the formal commercial 
banking sector to play a more active development role. Development banks—specialized 
public institutions that have been capitalized by government—have played an instrumental 
role in the industrial development of many countries. There is a need to re-examine the 
potential of development banks in African countries such as The Gambia as a proven 
institutional channel for allocating resources to support employment-enhancing investments 
and other development objectives. 
The potential of development banking is made clear by Alice Amsden in her seminal work 
The Rise of the Rest:  Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies.  Amsden begins 
her analysis with the general observation that:   
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“The state’s agent for financing investment was the development bank.  From the viewpoint of  
long-term capital supply for public and private investment, development banks throughout “the rest” 
were of overwhelming importance,” (2001, p. 127). 
 
Amsden goes on to document the pivotal role of development banking in Mexico, Chile, 
Korea, Brazil, and Indonesia. In many of these countries, development banks helped to finance 
between a fifth and a half of all fixed capital investment. Since developmental investment 
generates benefits that extend well beyond private profitability, development banks can play a 
key role financing activities in which the private financial sector would otherwise under-invest.  
Development finance works by channelling resources to priority areas. In essence, it 
performs a credit allocation function. Credit allocation policies often have a bad reputation  
in many African countries. In many cases, credit allocation policies have been inefficient, 
hindered by favouritism and rent-seeking, and biased towards large-scale producers 
(Mkandawire, 1999). However, these problems are not inherent to credit allocation policies. 
They reflect the process whereby credit allocation has taken place in the past. With 
appropriate governance institutions in place, development finance has enormous promise  
for contributing to the realization of an employment-oriented growth path. 
Although this section has highlighted some alternative approaches to monetary and 
financial sector policies, we recognize that The Gambia is constrained by the IMF programmes 
under which the country is currently operating. The stipulations of the IMF programmes may 
limit the flexibility the country has in pursuing alternative macroeconomic strategies with 
different developmental objectives (e.g. employment creation as opposed to maintaining 
inflation in the lower single digits). This does not invalidate a discussion of alternative 
approaches, but it may limit the scope available for implementing the ideas outlined here. 
There is a real need to open the debate about the most appropriate macroeconomic policies 
to support a country’s long-run development objectives. 
EXCHANGE RATES AND TRADE 
The Gambia’s floating exchange rate regime was first introduced in 1986 as part of the 
country’s structural adjustment program.9 Prior to floating the Dalasi, the regime was 
significantly more interventionist in nature. Persistent balance of payments problems—
including critical reductions in foreign exchange reserves—were behind the decision to float. 
Before the floating exchange rate regime was introduced, a series of managed devaluations 
were implemented in the early 1980s in an attempt to address the perceived overvaluation of 
the Dalasi. These efforts were not deemed successful and the current market-driven exchange 
rate policy was adopted.  
The nominal exchange rate exhibited a dramatic devaluation from the early- to the mid-
1980s (see appendix). The decline in the value of the Dalasi triggered domestic inflationary 
pressures (see Figure 5, above). The increase in domestic prices meant that the real exchange 
rate did not exhibit the same depreciation as the nominal rate. However, the real exchange 
rate did depreciate modestly when the Dalasi was floated in 1986. 
Beginning around 2000, the nominal exchange rate experienced a milder depreciation.  
In this case, the real exchange rate declined along with the nominal rate. Although inflation 
accelerated with the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, it was not significant enough 
to offset a decline in the real rate. Figure 9 shows this trend in the real exchange rate index. 
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FIGURE 9 
Real Exchange Rate Index, The Gambia (1970-2006) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
 
These two depreciations of the real exchange rate corresponded with an improvement  
in The Gambia’s net export position—that is, in the value of exports less the value of imports 
(Figure 10). In both cases, the improvement in the trade balance was primarily due to a 
reduction in imports rather than a significant increase in exports. The fact that improvements 
in the trade balance have been associated with a more competitive real exchange rate raises 
the possibility that targeted exchange rate policies could be used to improve The Gambia’s 
external balance.10 Specifically, interventions into the foreign exchange markets could be used 
to maintain the value of the Dalasi at level consistent with a competitive real exchange rate. 
This differs from the exchange rate interventions pursued in the past which (unsuccessfully) 
tried to fix the value of the Dalasi. Instead, exchange rate interventions would be applicable 
only if an excessive appreciation of the real exchange rate were evident. Such an approach 
would involve moving from a floating exchange rate regime to a partially managed regime. 
The PRSP II recognizes that “exchange rate movements are an important dimension of  
the traders’ business environment” (p. 48). For some priority export sectors—e.g. the emerging 
horticultural sector—a properly aligned exchange rate will be of critical importance in 
supporting the sector’s competitiveness. However, the PRSP II does not discuss in detail the 
appropriate exchange rate policy that would support The Gambia’s development strategy. 
Stability of prices and controlling the money supply growth rate are the only policies 
mentioned with regard to the exchange rate. These policy tools may not be sufficient  
for creating the type of economic environment conducive to sustained improvements in 
employment opportunities.  
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FIGURE 10 
Net Exports as a Per Cent of GDP, The Gambia, 1970-2004 (Vertical Axis Reverse Scale) 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
 
There are several reasons to consider an active foreign exchange policy. First, in recent 
years, several middle income countries with floating exchange rates have experienced 
appreciations in their real exchange rates, with negative consequences for economic 
performance. Tight monetary policy has kept inflation low but, in some cases, has led to 
increases in real interest rates and an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Under these 
conditions, there is a risk that the real exchange rate will appreciate and the country’s 
competitive position will suffer despite low domestic inflation rates—in the context of purely 
market determined exchange rates. Currently, this does not appear to be a problem for The 
Gambia but it could emerge as an issue in the future. 
Second, improvements in the net export position support an employment-intensive 
growth path. In many cases, export-oriented sectors are also labour-intensive. Moreover, 
reductions in import penetration can be instrumental in giving import-competing activities a 
chance to grow. A competitive real exchange rate—if associated with an improvement in the 
trade balance—can support the growth of domestic productive activities that generate 
improved employment opportunities.  
Although a competitive real exchange rate has the potential of supporting an 
employment-intensive growth strategy, structural features of trade in The Gambia place 
important limitations on the effectiveness of exchange rate policy. Two important challenges 
are: (1) the extremely limited export base in the country, and (2) the reliance on imported raw 
materials and capital goods. The lack of a diverse export base means that other factors—such 
as shifts in commodity prices—may be more important in determining export success than the 
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real exchange rate. The reliance on imported inputs means that a weaker Dalasi will raise the 
cost of productions for import-dependent sectors, when the product is sold on the domestic 
market. For exporters who rely on imported intermediate goods, the impact is ambiguous.  
In this case, what matters is the exchange rate spread—i.e. differences in the buying and 
selling price of the Dalasi—and the volatility in the exchange rate between the time at which 
inputs are purchased and the time at which the final product is exported. Interventions to keep 
the exchange rate competitive must be balanced with the potential negative consequences  
of such actions. These features of The Gambia’s economy cannot be lightly dismissed when 
formulating macroeconomic strategies. 
The single most important export produced in The Gambia is groundnuts. In recent years, 
official measurements of the value of groundnut exports, including groundnut products, range 
between D250 and D500 million.11 The total value of exports has been volatile, as reflected  
in the wide range of export earnings. Groundnuts and groundnut products are basic 
commodities, so export earnings will be influenced by the prevailing world price. The global 
prices of these commodities are extremely volatile, although groundnut prices have been 
relatively stable in recent years (see Figure A3 in appendix). In addition, domestic production 
of groundnuts in The Gambia is also highly variable. The combination of volatile commodity 
prices and variable yields introduces a great deal of uncertainty into The Gambia’s export 
performance and this uncertainty will often overshadow the impact of the real exchange rate. 
In addition, there are institutional challenges associated with the marketing and 
processing of groundnuts, specifically associated with the Gambia Agricultural Marketing 
Company and the Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GGC). These difficulties have further 
constrained the capacity of the smallholder agricultural sector engaged in groundnut 
production. The failure of the GGC privatisation process, led the new private owners to design 
strategies based on the liquidation of the company and the selling of its assets rather than to an 
investment strategy aimed at increasing productivity and competitiveness, which has put many 
groundnut farmers under significant strain in recent years (Government of The Gambia, 2007). 
These institutional factors may be of greater importance for groundnut production and export 
than the real exchange rate. 
Re-exports—that is, the export of previously imported goods—account for another 
significant portion of trade in The Gambia. However, these products are not produced 
domestically and will have a limited impact on employment opportunities. Such trade, purely 
mercantile in character, may generate some economic benefits for the country, although the 
scope for value-addition will be limited at best. In addition, it is unclear that adjustments to  
the real exchange rate will have a lasting impact on the re-export market, for most of these 
goods are traded in foreign currencies. Instead, maintaining a stable exchange rate will be 
more important for the re-export trade than maintaining the real rate at a competitive level. 
Therefore, the scope for using macroeconomic policy interventions to support employment-
intensive growth through re-exports is limited. In addition, The Gambia has lost 
competitiveness in the re-export trade vis-à-vis neighbouring countries, particularly Senegal, 
which has gained significant advantage as a result of the West Africa Economic Union (Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine - UEMOA) convergent trade policies, liberalization and 
the improvement in Dakar Port services. A clear example of this is given by the re-direction of 
most Malian international transactions towards Dakar at the expense of other regional ports, 
including Banjul. 
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Tourism services have been identified as a potential sector that could generate foreign 
exchange and improve employment opportunities. According to data from the Central Bank  
of The Gambia, arrivals of air charter tourists have increased at an average annual rate of 
approximately 10 per cent between 2001 and 2005. Maintaining an attractive real exchange 
rate would help support the tourism sector. However, it is unlikely that exchange rate policy 
alone will be sufficient to promote tourism growth. Investments in public infrastructure and 
basic services are needed, if The Gambia is to establish itself as a significant tourist destination. 
Imported foodstuffs, intermediate inputs, and capital goods are important to the 
economy of The Gambia. Figure 11 illustrates the composition of imports, broken down into 
commodity groups. From this picture, we can understand why a nominal devaluation of the 
Dalasi is so often associated with greater inflationary pressures. In some cases—e.g., foodstuffs 
and energy—the impact is direct. A weaker Dalasi means higher prices of imported foods and 
fuels. In other cases—e.g., capital goods and productive inputs—the impact is indirect. Higher 
priced imports raise production costs and, depending on the degree of competition in the 
marketplace, a portion of these increases in cost is passed on as higher prices. 
FIGURE 11 
Imports by Major Commodity Group, The Gambia, 2001 
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Source: The Central Bank of The Gambia. 
 
The nature of domestic production and trade raises a similar issue regarding structural 
constraints in the context of exchange rate policies as was previously raised in the discussion 
of monetary policy. That is, the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies will be limited if 
complementary policies to address the structural challenges of The Gambia’s economy are not 
adopted. For example, productive sector policies to encourage the development of a more 
diverse array of exports and to promote the growth of import-competing activities have the 
potential to transform the economy in such a way as to make exchange rate policy a more 
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powerful instrument for development. The structural constraints on macroeconomic 
performance are not negligible and must be addressed directly in a comprehensive 
development strategy. 
FISCAL POLICY AND DEBT 
The budget is perhaps the most significant macroeconomic instrument for directed policy 
interventions to support a developmental agenda. Through the budget, governments can 
supply essential economic and social services, deliver basic infrastructure and other public 
goods, provide incentives that direct resources to priority activities, and create a social safety 
net to address economic vulnerability and poverty. However, sustainable fiscal policy requires 
careful management of public revenues, expenditures and borrowing. High levels of external 
and internal debt can squeeze public resources and contribute to economic instability. The 
Gambia has experienced excessive debt burdens and, accordingly, is part of the HIPC (heavily 
indebted poor countries) debt-relief program. If an employment-centred macroeconomic 
framework is to succeed, the developmental demands on the fiscus must be balanced against 
the requirements of sustainable public spending. 
Table 1 presents information on public expenditures and priorities in The Gambia in 2001 
and 2005. Between 2001 and 2005, total budgeted expenditures increased by 134 per cent—
from 1,590 million Dalais to 3,721 million. A reprioritization of expenditures accompanied this 
overall increase—one of the key objectives of the country’s poverty reduction strategies. 
Current expenditures as a fraction of the total budget declined in relative importance while 
development expenditures, including public investment, accounted for a noticeably greater 
share. Public investment in infrastructure is critical for economic development in countries 
such as The Gambia. Investments in roads, water, basic economic services and other public 
goods improve productivity and help reduce barriers to development (e.g., access to markets, 
high costs of production). In many cases, development spending also directly creates 
employment opportunities. Therefore, the reprioritization within the budget represents an 
important step towards building public assets for economic development and realizing the 
goals of poverty reduction. 
TABLE 1 
Budgetary Expenditures, The Gambia, 2001 and 2005 
Note: Based on upper poverty line. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on GBOS, 2007. 
Expenditures 2005 2001 
Total expenditures D3,721 millions D1,590 millions 
… of which …   
Current expenditure 65.0% 77.8% 
   Salaries and wages 14.8% 21.5% 
   Interest payments 30.4% 18.5% 
   Subsidies and transfers 6.2% 12.5% 
   Other current 13.7% 25.4% 
Development expenditure 32.1% 17.9% 
Other expenditure 2.8% 4.3% 
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Where do the resources come from to finance such a significant increase in expenditures? 
In recent years, the government of The Gambia has made significant progress in improving its 
revenues through taxation. From 2001 to 2005, total tax revenues grew from 854 million Dalais 
to 2,263 million, an increase of 165 per cent. In addition, the relative shares of different 
revenue sources have not changed dramatically over this same period (see Figure A4 in 
appendix). Grants represent a somewhat smaller share of total revenues and taxes on domestic 
goods and services have doubled their earlier share, but there have been no fundamental 
compositional shifts that would wholly explain the increase in public revenues. Instead, 
greater efficiency in tax collection has contributed to the mobilization of resources to support 
planned spending. In addition, higher rates of economic growth and the recent increases in 
the sales tax have also contributed to the growing revenue base.  
Improving the efficiency of revenue collection has been a significant target of The Gambia’s 
poverty reduction strategies. Mobilizing domestic revenues represents a critical component of 
sustainable fiscal management, since it supports developmental expenditures without relying 
on higher levels of domestic or external debt. The creation of the independent National Revenue 
Authority represents an important institutional change to enhance revenue collection. The PRSP 
II (2006) states that one of its primary macroeconomic policy goals is to “further improve revenue 
collection by strengthening the institutional capacity and procedures at the revenue 
departments” (p. 45). This represents a crucially important policy position for establishing a 
developmental macroeconomic policy regime. It also represents another way in which 
institutional reform is necessary for effective macroeconomic management.  
Despite the increase in revenues, the gap between planned expenditures and expected 
revenues in 2005 was large—about D932 million or an estimated 7 per cent of GDP. In the 
2005 budget, approximately half of this short-fall (D458 million) was to be financed through 
external borrowing and the remainder financed through domestic debt (D420 million) and the 
expected proceeds from privatization (D54 million).12  
The reliance on significant levels of debt financing—specifically domestic debt—is 
worrying on a number of fronts. As Table 1 (above) demonstrates, interest payments 
accounted for over 30 per cent of all public expenditures in 2005, up from 18.5 per cent in 
2001. According to the Central Bank of The Gambia, 79 per cent of these interest payments 
went to service the domestic debt. With the very high rates of interest prevailing in the 
economy, including the high real interest rates on treasury bills documented earlier, continued 
borrowing to finance public expenditures is likely to become unsustainable. That is, interest 
payments will account for an increasing share of public expenditures that cannot be used for 
developmental priorities. 
The domestic debt has implications for other areas of macroeconomic policy.  
As discussed previously, domestic financial institutions (such as commercial banks) have an 
incentive to hold their assets in public debt, since government securities earn high interest 
rates and are relatively risk free. The banks have less incentive to extend loans to support 
private investment, where risks and transactions costs tend to be significantly larger. This is 
particularly true for smaller-scale activities. Therefore, the capacity to extend developmental 
loans to the private sector remains below its potential. This situation can limit the effectiveness 
of financial reforms aiming to increase credit for priority areas—such as the diversification of 
The Gambia’s productive base or the promotion of employment-intensive development.  
In light of these concerns, the PRSP II pledges to keep the domestic debt at a level that  
would not undermine long-run fiscal stability.  
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How might The Gambia finance its planned expenditures without building up its public 
domestic debt and associated servicing costs? As discussed in the PRSP II, the country’s recent 
success at mobilizing domestic resources—evidenced in the substantial increase in tax 
revenues—should be expanded and built upon. Ultimately, it is this sustainable revenue base 
that provides the foundation for sound fiscal policies. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
have improved revenue collection through a diverse array of approaches (McKinley, 2007). 
These include preventing the erosion of traditional sources of revenue (e.g., taxes from 
international trade), improving the efficiency of tax collection, maintaining a diverse set of tax 
instruments, and exploring ways of raising domestic non-tax revenues (e.g., licensing fees for 
access to natural resources). 
A less restrictive monetary environment will also improve the sustainability of fiscal policy. 
Efforts to bring down the interest rate on public borrowing will reduce the fraction of the 
budget needed to finance the outstanding debt and the need for still more domestic 
borrowing. A coordinated macroeconomic strategy—if carefully implemented—can free up 
resources for developmental spending. 
The coordination of monetary and fiscal policy could be enhanced through the activities 
of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).13 Such coordination is essential for creating a 
macroeconomic environment conducive to employment creation. However, the type of 
coordination and the policy content of monetary and fiscal policies remain important.  
For example, as discussed in the PRSP II, in the past The Gambia has resorted to debt 
monetization to finance budget deficits in which the Central Bank lends directly to the 
government. Although this reflects a particular type of coordination, monetary policy may 
become subservient to the needs of the fiscus, making it harder to use monetary policy as a 
complementary tool for targeting other important economic variables. Similarly, policy 
coordination that focuses on a single, narrow target—e.g. very low inflation—may not be 
effective in creating the right sort of environment for expanding employment opportunities. 
External sources of finance are also a possible source of revenues, although dependence 
on external debt or official development assistance (ODA) has its own set of problems. High 
levels of external debt create similar problems as high levels of domestic debt. Moreover, 
volatility in the exchange rate can have a significant impact on servicing costs of the debt 
burden. This exposes the country to the greater risks and uncertainty inherent of global 
financial markets. ODA can be helpful in providing budget support to realize development 
objectives. However, ODA flows are subject to the decision-making processes of large donor 
countries and agencies. Long-run planning becomes difficult when commitments to ODA are 
unclear and uncertain. Moreover, the process of nurturing relationships with donors consumes 
resources and can shift government priorities. This is not to say that ODA has no role to play in 
supporting development strategies in The Gambia. However, ODA should not be pursued as a 
substitute for efforts to enhance domestic resource mobilization. 
3  POVERTY, LABOUR MARKETS, AND THE STRUCTURE  
OF EMPLOYMENT 
POVERTY 
Poverty is widespread in The Gambia. In 2003 the poverty headcount index was found  
to be 58 per cent. Available data suggests that the incidence, depth and severity of poverty 
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increased between 1992 and 1998, and then remained constant from 1998 to 2003 (Gambia 
Bureau of Statistics 2007). If these estimates are accurate, poverty increased when growth 
was low and erratic, while the incidence of poverty did not change during the years of 
accelerated growth. 
In The Gambia, poverty increases with household size14 but decreases with education.  
The incidence, depth and severity of poverty are more than twice as high for households with 
illiterate heads compared to households whose head is literate. The likelihood of being “poor” 
is higher in households located in rural areas, in polygamous families (which are more 
common in rural areas), in households headed by widows, people of advanced age or with no 
work experience, and in households with sick family members. Regional differences in poverty 
incidence are stark (see Table A2 in the appendix for details).  
The incidence of poverty for households whose head is employed in the agricultural 
sector is the highest (76.4 per cent—includes fishing and groundnuts activities). Next are 
households whose head works in the construction sector (63.6 per cent). By contrast, the 
incidence of poverty is lower for households whose head works in social services (45.4 per 
cent—includes personal services), in trade, hotels (48.8 per cent—includes restaurants), and in 
finance and administration - private as well as public (Figure 12). Regional disparities result in a 
low likelihood of being poor if the household lives in Banjul (Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 2007; 
Republic of The Gambia, 2006). 
FIGURE 12 
Poverty by Occupation of the Household Head 
 
Note: Based on upper poverty line. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on GBOS, 2007. 
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EMPLOYMENT AND THE LABOUR FORCE 
The population of The Gambia was estimated at 1.36 million in 2003, with an annual growth 
rate of 2.8 per cent (since 1993), and with over 55 per cent of the population living in the 
densely populated Greater Banjul Area. According to estimates from the World Bank and the 
International Labour Organization, the labour force as a percentage of the total population has 
remained stable in recent decades—at about 43 per cent. Census data from 2003 indicate a 
labour force participation rate of 48 per cent for the entire country. Rates are higher in rural  
(54 per cent) than in urban areas (45 percent), and are higher for illiterate people. Adults in the 
age ranges of 25-49 and 50-64 have participation rates almost twice as large as those of youth 
in the15-24 age brackets. Participation rates for males and females are fairly similar—a pattern 
which can be found in other sub-Saharan African countries, but which differs from many other 
parts of the world where women’s participation rates are frequently much lower than men’s. 
Unemployment in The Gambia is a source of concern. Using the latest population census, 
which is usually the benchmark reference for employment indicators, the national 
unemployment rate is not very high at 6 per cent. But the urban rate is 10 per cent (the rural rate 
is only 2 percent) and, moreover, the urban youth unemployment rate is very high, at 22 per cent 
(in rural areas youth unemployment is 3 percent).15 The National Employment Plan has thus 
appropriately called attention into the pressing issue of high unemployment rates among the 
urban youth aged 20-24 years old.16 Unemployment rates are generally higher among the more 
educated (Figure 13). The highest unemployment rate is found among those with secondary 
education (15 percent), while the lowest is found in those without any schooling (4 percent).   
FIGURE 13 
Unemployment Rate by Education Level, Population Census 2003 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations from Population Census 2003. 
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The PRSP II does not produce specific employment/unemployment figures but 
emphasises three important issues: (a) the greater relative importance of employment as a 
priority in urban areas (according to people’s perceptions); (b) the relatively high incidence  
of unemployment among graduates despite evidence of vacancies in the public sector; and  
(c) the significance of urban youth unemployment. 
The most acute employment problem in low income developing countries is seldom 
unemployment. Underemployment (i.e. part-time, seasonal and short-term employment and 
low average earnings due to poor productivity) is frequently of greater concern. Gambia’s IHS 
survey allows us to examine underemployment through the lens of number of working days per 
year. According to this data, most categories of workers worked around 200 days or more. In the 
case of wage workers, most of them worked year round or 313 days per year (Figure 14).17 These 
figures suggest that underemployment is not a particularly serious issue, at least not as serious 
as often assumed. However, this indicator does not provide information about other dimensions 
of underemployment, for example information on the number of hours worked per week.18 
FIGURE 14 
Days of Work Per Year (Median) – Employed Workers 
 
 
Source: Author calculations from IHS 2003 database. 
 
Moreover, underemployment—indicating an inadequate level of labour demand—may 
manifest itself in forms other than average work time (be it days per year or hours per week). 
Consider a self-employed street vendor. Demand for her labour (providing retail services) 
depends on the amount she can sell in any period of time. The amount she sells will also 
determine her earnings. If hourly earnings are low due to inadequate demand, she may  
work longer hours in an effort to generate more income in total. In this case, slack demand  
in the economy leads to longer working hours. However, the street trader in this example 
can still be considered underemployed, due to low levels of productivity and insufficient 
demand for her labour. 
The concept of “informal employment” is meant to capture forms of employment that 
lack regulatory, legal, and/or social protections. Informal employment is most often defined in 
terms of the nature of the enterprise in which the work takes place (i.e. the informal sector) and 
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the nature of the employment relationship (Hussmanns, 2004). In practice, enterprises are 
considered informal if they are unincorporated and unregistered with a government authority. 
When registration status is unknown, a size criterion is frequently used (e.g. informal enterprises 
have less than 5 employees). “Employment in the informal sector” comprises all employment 
that takes place in informal enterprises (including own-account workers, contributing family 
workers, paid employees in informal enterprises, informal employers, and members of informal 
cooperatives). Outside of the unregistered and/or small enterprises sector, employment may be 
considered to be informal if it lacks core legal or social protections, e.g. domestic workers.  
To be sure, de facto unregulated employment may also exist within the formal sector,  
i.e. in registered or large enterprises.   
Because of data limitations, we discuss informal employment by focusing on jobs in 
informal enterprises as captured by the economic census. Such employment is widespread in 
The Gambia. The 2004 Economic Census finds that there were 78,718 private establishments 
outside the crop sector where 223,610 people worked: 40 per cent as paid employees, 25 per 
cent as own account workers, 5 per cent as employers, 27 per cent as unpaid family workers, 
and the remaining 3 per cent as other temporary workers. Almost three quarters of these 
establishments were located in the Greater Banjul, Kanifing and Brikama Local Government 
Areas. The majority of these enterprises were unregistered (84 percent) and therefore can be 
classified as operating in the informal sector. 73 per cent of all working individuals in the  
non-agricultural enterprises captured by the economic census were employed in informal 
enterprises. As mentioned above, definitions of the informal sector frequently include small-
scale enterprises, not simply unregistered firms. If establishments with less than 5 workers 
were included in the informal sector of The Gambia, then the proportion of informal workers 
increases to 85 per cent of employment in non-agricultural enterprises.  
Informal establishments rely on unpaid labour (family or apprentices) but also hire a 
significant number of paid employees. Paid employees represent 53 per cent of all workers 
employed in unregistered non-agricultural enterprises. One should bear in mind that 
registering a business does not guarantee good employment conditions: while 16.1 per cent  
of all establishments declare to be officially registered, at the most, 12 per cent of them offer 
employee benefits.  
The Social Security and Housing Finance Cooperation (SSHFC) produces information on 
registered employment, which is often associated with formal employment. In 2006, registered 
employees in the SSHFC totalled 100,437 (of which 77,452 were in the private, 7,495 in the 
parastatal and 15,490 in the public sector).19 This data allows for comparisons across time. The 
data provided for the period 2001-2006 includes the number of workers in the parastatal and 
private sectors, suggesting significant increases in registered employees, especially in the 
private sector (Figure 15). 
The sectors and occupations in which individuals are employed differ along numerous 
dimensions: scale of operation, location, regularity of business, technologies, skills profile of 
the workforce, and degree of risk. Here we present some basic differences across sectors and 
occupations according to the available information. 
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FIGURE 15 
Number of Employees Registered with SSHFC (Provident Fund), 2001-2006 
 
Source: Authors construction based on data from Social Security and Housing Finance Cooperation. 
 
The 2004 Economic Census provides estimates of value-added and its various 
components by industry (for details, see appendix). The data suggest that the labour 
component of the value added is quite low (18 percent) with over 60 per cent accounted  
for by operating surplus (gross profits or revenues net of direct labour costs). However,  
there are significant variations across sectors. Some sectors contain a notably small labour 
compensation component (less than 15 percent), such as real estate, trade, agriculture and 
fishing. The low labour share reflects, in part, the predominance of small units (including  
own-account operations) and the reliance on unpaid family labour. Hence, the operating 
surplus includes the remuneration to the self-employed which include own-account workers, 
contributing family workers, and employers.  
Earnings diverge significantly across industries and occupations (Figure 16). The best-paid 
jobs are found in the finance and insurance sector, which employs a small number of workers, 
in construction and utilities, as well as in the health sector, which tends to employ more 
highly-skilled workers and thus pays better salaries. The sectors with the lowest average 
earnings are manufacturing and trade. Their average earnings are less than a twentieth of 
average earnings in finance, half the basic pay of the lowest paid civil servants, and lower than 
the current poverty line. These are sectors employing large numbers of workers. Trade, by 
itself, represents more than half of employment in sectors, while manufacturing accounts  
for more than one sixth. 
In some sectors there is potential for better paid jobs. This is the case with tourism, a 
sector where various unskilled workers are employed. In spite of being mostly unskilled jobs, 
wages are relatively good. The average yearly earnings of a worker in the hotel and restaurant 
sector is 28,000D.20 In contrast, the typical groundnut farmer earns only about Dalasi 7,000 per 
year from one hectare of output sold for export (World Bank and DOSTIE, 2006, p. 7). Although 
barriers to entry are not insurmountable, this sector has not yet displayed its full potential. 
Investments, state-led promotion abroad adequate supply of business services and adequate, 
efficient and on-site training programmes could result in an increase international demand  
for these services. 
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FIGURE 16 
Annual Average Earnings Per Employee by Industry, 2004 
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Gender is a significant differentiating factor in determining types of employment and 
occupations in The Gambia. Figures 17a and 17b show employment by occupation, disaggregated 
by sex. Male workers are employed in a wider range of occupations, partially a result of the 
education and training available to male workers and the customary gender roles in the Gambian 
labour market. There is also evidence of labour market segmentation by sex. Whereas employed 
men work in occupations such as vehicle driver, protection services, building, mechanic and 
fishery, female workers are predominantly employed in petty trading, domestic services and 
clerical jobs. While 45 per cent of men reported that they had never received any training, the 
proportion of women reporting that they had no access to training was 61 percent. 
There is evidence of a significant gender earnings gap. Rough estimates from the scarce 
data on wages and earnings for a range of workers who had received training suggest that the 
earnings of employed men are 1.6 times larger than those of employed women. There is 
substantial variation in the gender earnings gap. In some cases male and female wages are 
nearly identical, but there are instances where the ratios of men’s earnings to women’s can be 
as high as 3 and even 9.21 
It also appears from available evidence at the micro level that men dominate most forms 
of wage employment in rural and peri-urban areas, in agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. Women’s employment is concentrated in certain informal activities, such as own-
account employment or “on commission” work. It should be noted that it is frequently difficult 
to distinguish forms of self-employment from wage employment for women in urban informal 
activities. There is a continuum to the degree of precariousness which different types of 
employment exhibit in The Gambia, and women tend to be concentrated in more precarious 
forms of employment.  
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FIGURE 17A 
Top 10 Occupations: Males, 2003 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on data from Population Census 2003 (see Tables A6a-c). 
Note: Top 10 occupations represent 80 per cent of the 485,761 total employed population in 2003.  
The total male employed population in these occupations sums 188,665 workers. 
 
 
FIGURE 17B 
Top 10 Occupations: Females, 2003 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on data from Population Census 2003 (see Tables A6a-c) 
Note: Top 10 occupations represent 80 per cent of the 485,761 total employed population in 2003. The total female 
employed population in these occupations sums 200,915 workers. 
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Gender is a particularly significant differentiating factor in rural areas, especially in 
farming, where women take on specific roles within the household. In addition, men often 
dominate the rural labour markets for paid employees, especially seasonal migrant labour. 
However, it is not unusual to find younger women working for casual wages in operations such 
as weeding when they are freed from household chores. The incidence of this phenomenon, 
however, cannot be ascertained with the limited statistical information available.  
THE SUPPLY OF LABOUR 
The increase in the Gambian workforce has been steady since the 1980s and, not surprisingly, 
has paralleled the growth rate of the population. Labour force participation rates have 
remained more or less stable since 1983 with population growth rates hovering around 3  
per cent. The increase in the workforce has been particularly concentrated in urban areas  
as a result of migration. The process of urbanization has accelerated since the 1980s with  
the proportion of the urban population reaching 53 per cent in 2003 (see appendix). 
Consequently, urban areas such as Kanifing have attained a high population density  
on the order of 4,268 inhabitants per square kilometre (GOG et al. 2006, p. 28). 
A large proportion of employed women are engaged in crop farming—two-thirds of 
employed women are reported as crop growers, compared to only 36 per cent of men. In 
addition, fertility rates are relatively high, estimated at 5.4 children per woman, slightly above 
the 5.3 average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2005, p. 17). Therefore, most women 
combine market work (i.e. participation in remunerative or income-generating employment) 
with non-market work (e.g. unpaid childcare and household production). The responsibility 
for unpaid, non-market work influences the employment options available for women. For 
example, paid activities that prevent women from combining market and non-market work 
may not be accessible to economically active women. 
Labour supply in The Gambia is mainly unskilled, both in rural and urban areas. According 
to estimates derived from the population census, 47 per cent of the active and employed 
population has no formal schooling, only 3 per cent have completed a post-secondary 
degree/diploma (including vocational training), and a significant proportion (around 23 
percent) have attended only madrassas (daaras).22 As a result, average adult literacy rates 
remain low in The Gambia. According to the PRSP II, the national literacy rate is 46 per cent, 
with a significant gap between female rates (37 percent) and male rates (60 percent). 
According to the NTA survey on skills and employment, almost 50 per cent of the rural  
sample was illiterate (42 per cent in urban areas). On the basis of our calculations from the NTA 
survey, a staggering 54 per cent of the employed population had not received any training 
whatsoever, whether formal or informal (59 per cent in rural areas and 61 per cent in the case 
of women). For those who reported some form of training, the most common were the 
following. In rural areas: gardening, farming; tailoring, sewing, designing; soap making; in 
urban areas: tailoring, sewing, designing; (petty) trading; driving. Thus, significant differences 
in skills exist (Figure 18).23 
These estimates suggest that most of the training occurs on the job. Thus, the NTA sample 
survey suggests that organised forms of training (including vocational) only reach a small 
proportion of the employed population.  
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FIGURE 18 
Proportion of the Labour Force that Received Training by Type of Training,  
Disaggregated by sex, 2006 
 
Authors construction based on the NTA survey 2006 (see appendix, Table A7). 
Columns are decreasingly ordered, left to right, according to the total proportion of the labour force  
that received training. 
 
Despite low levels of literacy and skills development, The Gambia has made significant 
progress in bringing more children to the formal primary and secondary schooling system.  
As a result, the country has attained enrolment rates above the regional average and relatively 
high rates of progression from primary to secondary schools. According to estimates from 
2007, net enrolment rates in primary education increased from 48 per cent in 1991, to 67 per 
cent in 1999, and 73 per cent in 2001. Net enrolment in secondary education rose from  
26 per cent in 1999, to 33 per cent in 2001, and 45 per cent in 2004 (World Bank, 2007).  
Efforts to improve the human capital base are evident in these broad education 
indicators. These successes should improve employment prospects and economic mobility. 
However, high enrolment rates by themselves do not necessarily resolve other skill constraints 
that are currently evident in the Gambian economy. For example, higher enrolments will lower 
illiteracy, but only in the long-run. Moreover, formal schooling may fail to develop the skills 
most demanded in the current labour market. That is, a mismatch between the skills profile  
of the labour force and that needed to enhance employment opportunities may persist, 
despite improvements in school enrolments. 
Unsurprisingly, according to census data (Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 2006), in 2003 
those who report being paid employees, particularly those receiving a regular salary (rather 
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than irregular wages), also tend to be more highly educated. Within this group, the proportion 
of female employees with post-secondary educational credentials is greater than that of males, 
but for those who leave secondary school the case is reversed.24 
THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR 
Private sector. The private sector is the main employer in the economy. Data from the SSHFC 
not only confirms that the private sector is the most important formal employer, but also 
suggests that it is also the most dynamic employer. Registered workers in the private sector 
increased by 47 per cent between 2001 and 2006, compared to an increase of only 32 per cent 
in the parastatal sector. 
Opportunities for gainful rural employment, particularly in the farming sector, have 
declined due to the sluggish performance of the agriculture sector.25 The high poverty level  
of the rural areas (estimated at about 67-70 per cent of the rural population) means that 
households have few resources to invest in improving their productive capacities and, 
ultimately, their earning potential. Thus, a vicious circle of poverty, low income, low 
productivity and scarce assets is compounded by a lack of support to crop farming from state 
institutions. Arguably, farming households increasingly depend on external non-crop sources 
of income, including remittances from family members having moved to the Greater Banjul or 
neighbouring Senegal.26 
There is a general perception that the recorded increase in job opportunities in the 
private sector neither matches the increase in labour supply nor is consistent with the recent 
record of growth. Although the available evidence is far from sufficient to establish any firm 
conclusions, policy analysis suggests that there is scope to nurture a stronger labour demand 
response to the improved growth situation in The Gambia (WB-DOSTIE, 2006). In the course of 
our discussions with policy analysts, government officials, and business representatives, 
several constraints to employment creation were identified.  
Generally state regulation was considered almost irrelevant while unions were not 
perceived as obstacles to more employment creation. The constraints are generally found within 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions, the need to maintain competitiveness, and the scarcity of 
investment opportunities. The extremely small size of the Gambian market is often given as the 
reason for the scarcity of investment opportunities and the weak capacity to attract more foreign 
direct investment (FDI). This also explains the predominance of micro-enterprises in 
manufacturing and trade and the very large proportion of imported consumer goods.  
The historical entrepôt nature of the Gambian economy means that investments in 
productive value-enhancing activities have been scarce. Instead, services and petty 
manufacturing apart from agriculture remain important pools of jobs with little success in 
attracting investment (Figure 19). Under these conditions, the country has tended to follow a 
growth path where most investment opportunities, especially for short-term profits, tend to 
be located in the sphere of exchange and distribution, while other productive sectors appear 
less attractive. Investment opportunities in productive activities could be greatly enhanced 
by substantially improving incentives and infrastructure, especially in manufacturing, 
horticulture and tourism. Policies would need to be developed to shift the country onto this 
alternative growth path. 
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Moreover, scarce private investment is associated with both high transaction costs and a 
perceived lack of profitable opportunities. High transaction costs, which hinder the expansion 
of productive capacities and the upgrade of micro and small informal businesses, also affect 
the survival rate of many of these establishments, which according to the Economic Census 
tend to be rather young. A vicious circle is created between the weak productive capacity of 
small-scale private businesses and their perceived creditworthiness. Despite the proliferation 
of commercial banks and financial institutions over the last few years, access to credit remains 
a critical constraint for most local enterprises. As has been discussed earlier, interest rate 
spreads are large, reflecting the risk perception of banks and their lack of interest in expanding 
the range of activities and business to which they offer loans. 
FIGURE 19 
Number of Workers Employed by Industry, 2003 
 
Source: Authors construction based on data from Population Census 2003 (see appendix, Table A8). 
 
Another major constraint is the weaknesses of public infrastructure and the notably poor 
performance of the energy sector. According to sources in the Chamber of Commerce, many 
businesses need generators to maintain a predicable supply of electricity, but these are costly 
to purchase and operate, especially given high fuel prices. Poor transport infrastructure to 
neighbouring countries hinders the development of activities that could build competitive 
advantages by specialising in niches for regional markets beyond Senegal. The enclave 
position of The Gambia within Senegal impedes developing better communication 
infrastructure to link to other neighbouring countries, Mali, for instance. 
The bad publicity of political instability and conflict in neighbouring countries over the 
last 15 years has gradually eroded the capacity to attract investment to The Gambia. Often, 
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with the exception of investors concentrating in natural resource extraction for whom  
The Gambia currently has little to offer, foreign investors respond strongly to region-wide 
perceptions. Furthermore, the potential for higher labour demand in well-established sectors, 
such as trade and transport, is hampered by the saturation level of these activities and the 
declining importance of the re-export trade.  
Despite the many constraints on labour demand, there is scope for a number of sectors to 
improve their competitiveness and grow more rapidly in the future. According to the DTIS 2006 
(WB-DOSTIE 2006), substantial poverty reduction could be obtained through the promotion of 
exports in three activities: cashew nuts, groundnuts and tourism. The tourism sector is less 
labour intensive than the agricultural sector but its higher remuneration has the potential to lift 
workers and their families above the poverty line. Through the multiplier effect of improved 
household incomes on family labour, the agricultural sector would provide thousands of jobs to 
people living in rural areas. Higher demand for labour in these sectors may also inject greater 
dynamism into local labour markets and further reduce underemployment. If this happens, 
pressures to migrate to overcrowded and saturated labour markets in Grater Banjul may relax 
and a more balanced pro-poor employment pattern be achieved. 
Public sector. Employment in the public sector, which includes the civil service and the 
parastatals, appears to have declined since the mid-1980s. We could not obtain a consistent 
time series on public sector employment, but the available estimates suggest that the number 
of civil servants, especially relative to total employment, has fallen. An initial civil service 
squeeze took place in the mid-1980s under the first structural adjustment programmes. Since 
then, there has been a tendency to freeze civil service employment while the turnover within 
the civil service has also increased. As of June 2007, only 13,599 civil servants were recorded in 
post, compared to the 15,940 recently reported by the IMF (IMF 2006, p. 18). The civil service 
represents approximately 3 per cent of total employed population in the country and 13 per 
cent of paid employees. Between 2001 and 2006, employment in the parastatals increased by 
almost one third. This process has been uneven, as not all public enterprises have managed to 
create jobs. One of them, the Gambian Ports Authority, has expanded gradually over the last 
five years, even as the size of the dock workforce has remained stagnant.27 
Several persons interviewed mentioned the problem of high attrition rates in the public 
sector, especially among civil servants.28 The level of remuneration for government employees 
on average falls below the pay scales in the private sector for equivalent jobs and 
qualifications. Thus, the attractiveness of public sector employment has been significantly 
reduced after years of structural adjustment and fiscal austerity.29 Another factor that is more 
difficult to measure and pin down is the apparent “insecurity” and instability of civil service 
jobs, which seems to be an emerging phenomenon. If true, this would further reduce the 
incentives to work in the public sector because one of the attractive features of public 
employment in the past has been the prospects of job security and non-wage benefits.  
On the whole, the dwindling employment levels and the high attrition in the civil service 
may be a result of a combination of factors: a) the streamlining of the public sector; b) the high 
incidence of dismissals for reasons that sometimes remained unexplained; c) the loss of 
experienced and competent public sector employees to the private sector or to international 
organisations which offer higher wages for similar skills and tasks.30  
One factor which may partially counteract these trends is the potential for upward job 
mobility among middle-level civil servants. The analysis of the 2007 count of civil servants in 
post suggests that while unfilled positions do exist, the vacancy rate of 8 per cent does not 
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represent a substantial problem: 13,599 civil servants in post compared to 14,741 authorised 
posts.31 However, despite the fact that the dismissals and rotations affecting senior and 
middle-level public servants may not add up to a large number of positions, their qualitative 
impact on the remaining employees, especially in terms of morale, and on the institutional 
capacity to attract good candidates may be significant.  
A World Bank report (2005) presents evidence that human resource scarcity and “brain 
drain” was particularly alarming in certain areas, such as accountancy and IT management, 
which causes the performance standards of certain public sector operations to slip over time. 
This was also explicitly echoed by a government document with reference to 
macroeconomic management: 
“At the macro level, the major constraint faced in the implementation of The Gambia’s PRSP is human 
resource scarcity. As at now most of the people who worked with the World Bank on the costing and 
financing exercise have now left the Civil Service. The high attrition and turn over within the “PRSP 
team” has also spread to the social sectors with poor transmission of technical information from one 
team to another. Scarce technical and financial resources needed to address the critical implementation 
bottlenecks faced at the implementation stage aggravate the poor human resource base.”  
(Republic of The Gambia, 2006, p. 52). 
 
The issue is not so much the inability of the public administration to recruit across the 
board, although the vacancy rate in some areas remains a concern. The issue is the high 
turnover and shifting of human resources across institutions within the civil service. Whereas 
this mobility may be expected to increase productivity and reduce the potential for nepotism, 
the serious danger of losing institutional memory and eroding the morale and security of the 
staff in post must be taken into account. Thus, labour churning within the civil service may 
eventually reinforce the growing unattractiveness of public sector employment.  
RURAL LABOUR MARKETS 
The urban labour market situation can be analysed using data such as economic census and 
household surveys. Specific surveys designed to capture informal activities provide 
information about own-account and unpaid workers in urban labour markets. Although 
household surveys are also applied in rural areas, their capacity to adequately capture the 
peculiarities of rural labour markets is limited. Unless an in-depth labour force survey is 
administered, it will be difficult to ascertain the characteristics and dynamics of rural 
employment and the structural characteristics of rural labour markets.  
Participation in rural and peri-urban labour markets and the incidence of non-farm wage 
employment is not restricted to a few months during the rainy season (noran). Household 
members may engage in non-farm wage activities throughout the year (Roth et al. 1996).  
The seasonal and irregular nature of labour peaks is associated with the hiring of seasonal  
and casual labourers, who may come from the local area or migrate from other regions. The 
personalisation of employment relations and a degree of “paternalism” among employers is 
also a typical feature of rural labour markets. 
Rural labour markets frequently exhibit a mismatch between the supply of and demand 
for labour, linked to the adoption of certain production technologies and the crops under 
cultivation. For example, a study on agricultural mechanisation in The Gambia suggests that 
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particular labour supply bottlenecks were driving some farmers to mechanise (Van der 
Meijden, 1994). In turn, this mechanization provided opportunities to increase cultivated areas 
and yields, thereby increasing labour demand in non-mechanized operations. At the same 
time, the use of animal traction remained prevalent in the cultivation of groundnuts, rice, 
and certain other food crops. Moreover, women are traditionally employed producing specific 
crops, where they carry specific tasks and use particular technologies, and men are employed 
producing others. It is important to capture the intricacies of rural labour and agricultural 
production when developing policies to enhance productivity and the quality of employment 
in the rural areas. 
Like much of the labour market in Gambia, rural labour markets are not subject, at  
least de facto, to effective regulation. Remuneration and working conditions depend on the 
particular agreements between employers and workers. These agreements vary according  
to task, crop, and the time of the year. Employment relationships reflect “norms” and 
conventions, and therefore are seldom subject to a legally enforceable contract. Thus,  
daily wages or payments for specific tasks (like groundnut threshing or weeding) have a 
“conventional price” that is territorially determined and sometimes village-specific. The fact 
that many of these labour transactions are highly personalised contributes to the localized and 
segmented nature of payment and work conditions. The village or district chief may settle any 
disputes in the event the parties are unable to reach a settlement on their own. 
However, the recent introduction of the fee-based Resident Permits may have had 
implications on rural labour markets and production. Having been set at D7,500 per person  
per year for all non-Gambians, the provision has imposed restrictions on the available supply 
of migrant labour to the rural and agricultural areas. The new permit system not only had a 
dampening effect on agricultural production, productivity and output, but it also affected 
groundnut marketing activities that had hitherto depended largely on seasonal migrant labour 
for production and marketing. Therefore, efforts to improve farm output from the rural areas 
must address constraints to labour supply to agricultural production. 
SKILLS PROFILE OF THE WORKFORCE 
As discussed in previous sections, most of the labour force in The Gambia is employed in low-
skill activities and, indeed, one highlighted problem has been the inadequate and generally 
weak skill base of the Gambian labour force. Thus, the labour force seems divided into two 
broad categories: a) a mass of workers with little specific and employable skills and very low  
or no basic education, b) a growing number of secondary school drop-outs and trainees of 
technical schools, who have concentrated in skills for clerical white-collar jobs in finance, 
services and tourism. Two issues emerged in the interviews with representatives of the public 
and private sectors concerning the segmented nature of the Gambian workforce. 
First, it is often argued that one problem resides in the inadequacy of skill development 
and training given the features of the Gambian labour market and national-regional labour 
demand patterns. Few Gambians are trained for occupations in high demand, such as 
masons, carpenters, and wielders. These skills are seldom taught in formal schooling 
environments. Moreover, private training initiatives overwhelmingly concentrate on IT and 
management, cultivating skills for which there are currently a relatively few number of viable 
employment opportunities.  
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According to expert sources in the field of vocational skill training, the private training 
sector is essentially supply-induced as it depends on the interests, expected profits, and 
initiatives of small entrepreneurs who prefer to offer training in saturated fields. Most private 
providers are very short of capital and provide training that requires little investment, aiming 
fashionable courses at more educated and well-off classes of the urban youth. The degree of 
mismatch could be reduced by making training more demand-driven and encouraging 
employers to participate more actively in the development and implementation of training 
programmes. Moreover, the government could strengthen information systems on which skills 
are in demand and adopt a framework that regulates entry into the vocational training sector 
on the basis of what is required by the labour market. 
Second, the overall skills base of the labour force remains very low, as reflected in the 
average years of schooling and the literacy rates. These basic skills provide for access to more 
advanced skills training, especially for apprenticeships in manufacturing and building sectors. 
Thus, a general improvement in basic literacy and numeracy seems a precondition for further 
strengthening the human capital in the country. 
Furthermore, one of the most important routes to the adequate building of skills is on-
the-job training and work experience (Sender et al. 2005). According to some interviewees, the 
perception among many Gambian youth that certain occupations are either too “low” in terms 
of career aspirations and prestige or too heavily dominated by foreigners discourage them 
from seeking employment in these areas. This can reduce the opportunities for Gambians to 
acquire necessary skills through work experience. 
The current weaknesses in skills development may be traced back to the origins and 
historical evolution of the Gambian education system. The Gambia’s formal education system 
evolved from the colonial system emphasizing the development of a cadre of lower and middle 
level support staff for the colonial administration. As the administration paid little attention to 
formal technical skills development, no facilities for such training were established. 
Requirements for technical skills were met through an informal apprentice system by which 
young adolescents, on completion of formal standard VII and Koran-based education, would be 
attached to practicing technicians in specific areas, particularly in public works and commercial 
firms, until certified as competent tradesmen.  They would then be absorbed into these units 
depending on available vacancies or released to fend for themselves.  
By the time of independence in 1965 only three high schools were in existence: The 
Gambia, St. Augustine’s and St Joseph’s High Schools. Two middle or secondary technical 
schools complemented the system:  the Armitage in George Town, which opened in 1948 to 
cater to the education of the sons of chiefs and rural dignitaries; and the Crab Island School, 
which opened in 1958 to provide space for children who could not find places in the limited 
number of existing high schools. In the late 1970s the Ahmadiya Muslim mission added  
three more high schools, located at Bundung in KMC, Bwiam in the Western Division,  
and Basse in the URD. 
Beginning in 1994, the provision of education has expanded rapidly. First, the number 
of formal schools increased significantly. Indeed, between 1999/00 and 2004/05 the 
number of schools went up by 100 (see Table A9 in the appendix). This increase was 
concentrated in secondary schooling, in an effort to meet the government objective  
to improve access to secondary schooling and to ease the transition from primary to 
secondary education.32 Second, as noted above, the expansion of private sector training 
has also been remarkable, even if it was restricted to training in IT and business 
management, with few quality guarantees. 
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According to the results of the NTA survey, “the skills that are dominated by non-
Gambians and still in short supply are: auto/motor mechanic, taxi driver, trader and 
hairdresser” (NTA, 2006, p. 15). Figure 20 summarizes the findings of unsatisfied demand for 
skills by type of area. Hence, training in tailoring, designing, sewing, tie & dye, plumbing, 
electrician, mechanics, welding and carpentry top the list of a large sample of respondents  
in urban and rural areas (NTA, 2006). There is a demand for the type of employable skills that 
foreigners possess. In sum, the expansion of education and training of Gambians is a valuable 
step forward, but one that needs to be complemented with programmes devoted to skills 
acquisition in priority areas. 
FIGURE 20 
Skills Shortages in Urban and Rural Areas, 2006. Per Cent of Respondents Identifying the  
Need for more Skilled Individuals by Skill Category 
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Source: Authors construction based on data from the National Training Authority, 2006 (Table 12). 
Note: The tailoring category also includes designing and sewing. 
IMMIGRATION AND SPATIAL MOBILITY OF LABOUR 
The importance of foreign labour, particularly of Senegalese, was a recurrent theme in most  
of the interviews conducted and respondents raised a general concern about the extent to 
which the borders of the Gambian labour market are porous. Respondents indicated that  
in some sectors the overwhelming presence of “foreigners” was clear, such as construction 
(where apparently up to 80 per cent of workers are Senegalese), fisheries, and various trades in 
the informal sector in the overpopulated areas of Kanifing Municipal Area. It appears that even 
in sectors where the Gambian labour force has usually dominated, like tourism, the hiring of 
foreign workers is becoming increasingly common (up to 40 per cent of hotel workers may be 
foreign-born).    
To keep things within perspective, one should not forget that although these figures  
are high, construction, fisheries, and tourism represent together less than ten per cent of total 
employment. Furthermore, data from the Census and the Economic Census suggests that  
the presence of foreign labour is not as important as the interviews suggest. Foreign-owned 
establishments, which might have an inclination to hire foreign workers, employ 22 per cent  
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of wage employees and account for 15 per cent of unpaid contributing workers (Table 2). The 
presence of foreign-owned establishments (across a number of sectors, but especially notable 
in trade activities) is more marked in urban areas, where they account for 25 per cent of all 
establishments. The population Census 2003 found that 13 per cent of both the economically 
active and employed populations were “non-Gambians”. A recent survey of the fishery sector 
confirms a significant proportion of units owned by foreigners, mainly of Senegalese origin, 
but not overwhelming, as many of the individuals we interviewed had suggested.33 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Workers by Type of Establishment 
 Workers employed   
Type of establishment Paid labour  numbers 
Unpaid labour  
numbers 
Paid labour  
in % of total 
Unpaid labour 
in % of total 
Registered 38,046 14,516 33% 18% 
Not registered 76,339 67,556 67% 82% 
Individual proprietor 92,053 75,729 81% 92% 
Partnership 9,388 5,598 8% 7% 
Company 6,468 291 6% 0% 
Cooperative 903 183 1% 0% 
Public 3,349 - 3% 0% 
NGO 1,563 90 1% 0% 
Gambian Owned 86,408 69,338 76% 84% 
Joint Gambian/Foreign 2,678 568 2% 1% 
Foreign Owned 24,892 12,198 22% 15% 
Total 114,086 82,122 100% 100% 
Note: due to missing values for some variables tabulated, the sum of workers is lower than the final estimate  
of 223,610 workers from the full Economic Census 2004. 
Source: Author calculations from Economic Census dataset. 
 
There may be reasons to question the validity of some of the information collected 
through large-scale censuses and surveys. Survey enumerators normally have no means to 
confirm the nationality of the respondents and report what respondents say. Some foreign-
born respondents may have obtained Gambian nationality after years of residence, even if 
they continue to be perceived as “foreigners”. Thus, the actual distinction between Gambians 
and non-Gambians is not necessarily obvious or invariant in the context of a large-scale 
quantitative survey.  
Four major reasons exist for the disproportionate presence of non-Gambian labour in 
various occupations. First, The Gambia is geographically surrounded by Senegal and their 
populations are linguistically and ethnically similar. This facilitates the movement Senegalese 
labour into The Gambia.  
Second, there is an acute scarcity of skills among Gambians in particular occupations.  
This relative scarcity, especially vis-à-vis Senegal, may have some historical roots. As mentioned 
above, before the founding of the technical training school in Banjul in the 1960s, skilled labour 
was provided through informal apprentice arrangements within technical units of organizations 
and government departments. The manpower made available through this system was primarily 
targeted at meeting short-term needs identified by government and the existing foreign-
owned commercial firms. No serious planning effort was ever made to develop a cadre of 
skilled technicians who could satisfy the needs of a growing population. As a result, 
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unforeseen and urgently needed skilled manpower needs were often met through migration 
from the neighbouring regions of Senegal, where the formal apprenticeship and skill based 
training institutions have been in existence since the colonial period. Moreover, a shortage of 
skilled labour in social services has traditionally existed. So the influx of educated refugees as 
teachers and health staff from war-torn Sierra Leone, Liberia and other West African 
Anglophone countries was quite significant in the recent past.   
Third, the low cost of immigrant labour and the lack of enforcement of basic labour 
standards encourages the hiring of migrant labour. Wages offered in certain sectors may  
be too low to induce entry from local workers, although accurate measurements of the 
reservation wage among economically active Gambians are not available. Some argue that 
migrant workers, especially those coming for short periods of time, are more compelled to find 
irregular or seasonal work in order to save money before returning to their country of origin. 
Seasonal labour circulation between Senegal and The Gambia has the effect of driving wages 
down for certain occupations.  
Fourth, some occupations, especially in the informal sector, tend to be highly segmented 
and rely on social networks to function effectively. This is the case with trade in which certain 
migrant communities (Mauritanian, Senegalese and Arab-Lebanese) seem to control large 
niches of the sector. If such networks are essential to be competitive in cross-border trade,  
the barriers to entry for Gambian workers may be high. The existence of closed networks of 
employers and workers with a significant migrant presence runs the risk of creating niche 
economies and reinforcing particular forms of economic exclusion along the lines of 
nationality and ethnicity. This could foster a degree of resentment among the local population, 
especially the urban youth, if unemployment figures and the incidence of “discouraged 
workers” increase. 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
Labour institutions in The Gambia, a country characterised by a largely laissez faire regime, are 
generally weak. Neither the respondents from state and private institutions nor the Investment 
Climate surveys carried out by the World Bank mentioned labour regulation as a constraint on 
growth and private sector development. But the danger is that very weak labour institutions 
might actually hinder growth and development. 
The minimum wage, for example, is an important labour force component that can assist 
in the reduction of poverty (Devereux 2005, Fields and Kanbur 2005, Lustig and McCleod 
1996). The minimum wage in Gambia has not been reviewed since 1996 and it can be said that 
the minimum wage is institutionally non-existent.34 The ongoing wage rate for very low-skill 
occupations (e.g., D50 in the construction sector) 35 seems far superior to the official minimum 
wage for similar jobs (currently at D12.9). 
Labour unions appear to be of marginal influence. A system of periodic dialogue between 
private employers and workers’ representatives does not seem to exist in practice even if some 
of these mechanisms at the industry level may be formally in place. Thus, it is unclear which 
organizations in The Gambia actually represent the interests of the workers across a wide 
range of sectors. 
After interviews with representatives of the Labour Department, the private sector and 
other state institutions, it became clear that most labour market institutions in The Gambia  
are weak. They suffer from severe capacity constraints that impaired their important role in 
regulating and monitoring employment and labour market performance. Unfortunately, this 
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weakness has not been tackled by the National Employment Policy even as the document 
recommended bold actions towards the strengthening of the Labour Department and the 
country’s labour market institutions. 
4  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Over the past 10 years, The Gambia has reversed several decades of slow and volatile growth 
performance. Despite the dramatic drop in economic growth in 2002, when groundnut 
production fell significantly due to crop failure, the economy grew at an average rate of  
4.5 per cent from 1998 to 2005. Between 2003 and 2005, the average growth rate was even 
higher—at 5.7 per cent. These are peak growth rates in the country’s post-independence 
history, yet faster growth has not translated into broad-based development and poverty 
reduction. This report has argued that, given recent trends and the structure of the economy, 
even if The Gambia maintained growth rates at around 6 per cent in the years to come, this 
level of growth alone would not be sufficient to improve employment opportunities and 
reduce poverty: the type of growth matters. Available data indicates that poverty in The 
Gambia increased when growth was slow, but the years of more rapid growth were only 
sufficient to prevent poverty from rising further. If growth generates few new opportunities for 
the people of The Gambia or if the benefits of this growth are unequally shared, achieving the 
country’s development objectives and aspirations will become difficult, if not impossible.  
One of the primary ways in which individuals participate in the economic life of the nation 
is through employment. A development strategy that aims to increase employment and 
improve its quality will widen the opportunities to share in the benefits of growth. The Gambia 
has already taken steps towards the implementation of an employment based development 
strategy as evidenced by the initiatives contained in the National Employment Policy (NEP) 
and National Employment Action Plan (NEAP). Furthermore, to support the implementation  
of NEP and NEAP the government has articulated The Gambia Priority Employment Program 
(GAMJOBS) 2007-2011.  
This paper aimed to support the goals and objectives of initiatives such as the GAMJOBS 
programme by providing in-depth analysis in two critical policy areas: macroeconomic 
strategies and the Gambian labour market. Macroeconomic policies determine the overall 
environment within which a development strategy must operate. Such policies are broad-
based and, if well-designed, will support targeted initiatives to create jobs and improve 
economic opportunities. However, improving the quantity of remunerative work through 
employment-friendly macroeconomics is not enough. Working Gambians need to realize 
higher returns to their labour and need to be in a position to take advantage of better 
opportunities when they arise. Therefore, policies which develop the labour force and improve 
the functioning of labour markets are essential.   
One key finding of this report is that structural features of the Gambian economy and the 
nature of existing institutions influence the effectiveness of broad-based policy initiatives. For 
example, monetary policy can support the creation of better employment opportunities, but 
only if the financial sector is reformed to insure that resources are channelled to socially 
productive uses. Similarly, labour market regulations must be appropriately designed and 
enforced if the country’s human resources are to be mobilized for development.  
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In the course of the research that went into this report, we examined major 
macroeconomic trends, employment conditions and the poverty situation using the available 
data available and assessed, when possible, changes and trends through time. The findings 
and recommendations of this paper are drawn primarily from macro trends, the poverty 
picture that emerges from the 2003 survey, and the status of employment as compiled from a 
variety of sources. As pointed out in the introduction, the primary purpose of this paper has 
been to identify areas in which macroeconomic and labour market policies could be changed 
or developed to better support an employment-focused growth strategy. Therefore, the paper 
has not attempted to present a set of detailed policy options for The Gambia, but instead 
presented broad recommendations that Gambian policymakers could use to inform their 
employment strategies. Based on the evidence and in line with the proposals contained in 
several government documents, this paper makes the following recommendations.  
Monetary policy which attempts to achieve very low inflation rates by targeting the growth 
rate of monetary aggregates will often be unsuccessful because of the supply-side nature of 
price dynamics in The Gambia and the weak relationship between the growth of monetary 
aggregates and inflation. This type of monetary regime will contribute to high real interest rates 
and introduce a pro-cyclical bias which will impede the realization of poverty-reducing growth. 
Therefore, an alternative approach to monetary policy—for example, one that targets real 
interest rates at a level consistent with long-run economic growth—is warranted. 
Financial sector reform is a necessary complement to an alternative approach to 
monetary policy. Policies are needed to channel resources to activities whose growth will 
improve employment opportunities and thereby improve the efficiency of macroeconomic 
interventions. The core objective of financial reform is to improve access to credit. Inadequate 
access to credit limits the productivity and increases the risks of small-scale enterprises and the 
self-employed. Financial reform to enhance access to credit should be pursued through a 
coordinated set of policies. Examples include initiatives to discourage banks from holding 
short-term government securities by providing incentives for extending credit to priority 
activities; develop a publicly financed credit guarantee scheme to lower risk premiums; 
facilitate the creation of better credit information systems to provide accurate data on the 
creditworthiness of underserved borrowers; support the development of financial institutions 
that operate independently of the commercial banking sector; and foster linkages between 
commercial banks and informal credit institutions. 
An exchange rate regime which is informed by market dynamics but is managed to 
ensure international competitiveness should be used to improve the net export position  
of The Gambia. A competitive real exchange rate can also support improvements in the 
productive sector—such as creating a more diversified export base and encouraging the 
growth of domestic activities that may be subject to the adverse effects of excessive import 
penetration. Exchange rate policies, by themselves, are insufficient. They need to be 
accompanied by targeted industrial policies to support the development and diversification  
of the Gambian economy. 
Industrial policies should target sectors that have the highest potential of employment 
creation, especially for unskilled labour. Sectors that have been identified as high priorities 
include horticulture, groundnuts, fisheries, re-export activities, and tourism. The types of 
policy interventions that would support the development of these sectors range from  
fiscal incentives to priority credit allocation for long-term investment to the provision of 
infrastructure. The ultimate goal of such policies is to generate new employment 
opportunities and raise the average quality of existing jobs. Therefore, the government 
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will want to monitor and evaluate the performance of beneficiaries in the private sector in 
terms of their ability to meet specific targets on employment creation, job quality, domestic 
investment, and up-grading their productive activities. 
Most of the policies put forward in this report require carefully targeted and 
administered budget expenditures. Expenditures can be financed by improved domestic 
resource mobilization and supplemented by ODA inflows. Increases in domestic borrowing 
are only advisable if it can be shown that high debt levels will not compromise long-run 
fiscal sustainability and other macroeconomic goals. Capital expenditures are particularly 
important. The budget should make allowance for targeted public investments to ensure 
that the infrastructure needs are met for sectors prioritized for their employment impact.  
As part of the effort to scale-up infrastructure delivery, public work programmes could be 
used to directly create new employment opportunities. 
If these employment strategies are to be successful in reducing poverty, they must be 
accompanied by efforts to improve the economic mobility of the poor and raise their average 
returns to labour. To this end, there is a need to ensure that skill and training policies are 
designed to enhance “employability”. This will require both in-depth work with employers  
and labour force data to provide the skills and training that will be needed in the future. 
Institutions such as the NTA should be strengthened in order to better regulate the training 
offered by the private sector and to establish incentives for expanded training to develop skills 
in short supply. 
Self-employment is an important source of income for many Gambians. Therefore, in the 
short-term, support for own-account workers and small-scale enterprises could be extended 
and improved. In part, this would involve improving access to credit—an issue already 
highlighted. But also it requires the provision of greater technical support to micro and small 
businesses. Special programmes providing support to micro and small businesses more likely 
to become self-sustained in current economic conditions should also be considered. Such 
programmes should also include middle-size businesses, which seldom qualify to access 
formal finance. For reasons of scale and employment, these businesses have a good poverty-
reducing potential. Such support to micro, small and medium size businesses should include 
skills building, extension services, market facilitation, and building financial/credit 
management capacity. 
Labour market institutions are relatively weak in The Gambia. Strengthening such 
institutions, especially the Department of Labour, will improve the efficiency of labour markets, 
better match human resources with emerging opportunities, and support economic growth. 
For example, the government could initiate a “stocktaking” exercise to evaluate the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of current labour legislation with the ultimate aim of 
devising a regulatory framework that can address market failures and reduce transactions 
costs for employers and workers. As part of this exercise, careful consideration could be given 
to the establishment of an appropriate and enforceable minimum wage that would support 
the country’s poverty reduction targets. 
Migrant labour is an important issue for The Gambia, given its unique situation as an 
enclave economy, surrounded by Senegal. Migrant workers support economic growth, 
employment creation and competitiveness. However, an appropriate regulatory environment 
needs to be developed to insure that the benefits of migrant labour are realized and any 
associated costs minimized. Specifically, the Gambian government should try to coordinate 
with the Senegalese to offer incentives for managed labour mobility between the two 
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countries, to exploit any potential complementarities, and to ensure compliance with 
minimum labour standards. In addition, policies should also seek to remove barriers to the 
labour market mobility of Gambians themselves. Specific job centres could also be developed 
to facilitate the entry of Gambians into sectors where demand is high.  
Information on employment and the labour market situation is poor. This represents a 
significant handicap in developing an effective development strategy. Effective employment 
policies cannot be developed without reliable labour market information with which to 
evaluate successes and failures and to identify problems and potential solutions. There is a 
critical need to significantly improve the information systems on employment, labour force 
characteristics, and household living standards. At a minimum, The Gambia should assemble 
annual information, at least on formal employment, through the existing state institutions 
and private sector organizations that have access to such information. The role of the  
SSHFC should be extended to include the management of an annual private employment 
information system that generates data on a sectoral basis. Finally, there is a need to conduct 
regular, nationally representative household surveys with labour force and household 
enterprise modules. Such information would be a necessary input into the development  
of more effective employment-centred policies. 
Taken together, this set of policy recommendations would constitute the elements of  
an employment-based approach to human development and poverty reduction. This brief, 
concluding discussion is not meant to be comprehensive. Instead, it attempts to illustrate how 
a coordinated approach to policy—at a number of levels—can define an economic strategy 
that would improve employment opportunities on a sustainable basis. In so doing, this 
approach would not only improve rates of growth, but also insure that the benefits of such 
growth are shared widely among the Gambian population. 
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APPENDIX 
The appendix contains figures and tables which supplement those in the main text and 
provide detailed statistics on a number of the issues discussed. A list of the figures and tables 
can be found below. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES 
Figure A1. Agricultural Value-Added per Worker, 1970-2003. 
Figure A2. Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Indices, 1970-2006. 
Figure A3. International Price Indices for Groundnuts and Groundnut oil,  
  1970-2006. 
Figure A4. Total tax revenues from all sources, 2001-2005. 
Figure A5. Percent of wages and fringe benefits of employees in  
  total value added by industry, 2004. 
Figure A6. Urbanization trends, 1960-2005. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES 
Table A1. Budget revenues, 2001 and 2005. 
Table A2. Poverty indicators by region, 2003. 
Table A3. Basic employment indicators: various strata, 2003. 
Table A4. Components of Value Added by Industry, 2004. 
Table A5.  Sectoral distribution of employment and economic activity, 2004. 
Table A6 (a-c) Top 10 occupations of employed population  
  (disaggregated by sex), 2003. 
Table A7. Training received, total labour force disaggregated by sex, 2006. 
Table A8. Distribution of economically active and employed population by  
  industry, disaggregated by Sex, 2003. 
Table A9. Number of schools nationwide by level, 1999-2004. 
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FIGURE A1 
Agricultural Value-Added per Worker, The Gambia, 1970-2003 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
FIGURE A2. 
Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Indices, The Gambia, 1970-2006 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
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FIGURE A3. 
International Price Indices for Groundnuts and Groundnut Oil, 1970-2006 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, June 2007. 
 
FIGURE A4 
Total tax Revenues from all Sources, The Gambia, 2001-2005 (Millions of Dalasis) 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia. 
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FIGURE A5 
Percent of Wages and Fringe Benefits of Employees in Total Value Added by Industry, 2004 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Economic Census 2004. 
FIGURE A6 
Urbanization Trends, 1960-2005 (Population Projections) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2006. 
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TABLE A1 
Budget Revenues, The Gambia, 2001 and 2005 
Revenues 2005 2001
Total revenue D2,263 millions D990 millions
… of which …
Direct taxes 26.2% 25.4%
Indirect taxes 60.6% 60.9%
    domestic taxes on goods and services 14.4% 7.5%
    taxes on international trade 46.2% 53.4%
   petroleum taxes 11.3% 15.1%
Non-tax Revenue 13.3% 13.7%
Grants 8.4% 13.7%
   HIPC II assistance 0.7% 6.9%  
Source: The Central Bank of The Gambia. 
TABLE A2 
Poverty Indicators by Region, 2003 
Poverty Domain Estimate Std. Err. 
National 58.0 2.0 
Banjul+ Kanifing 34.0  3.7 
Other urban 56.0 5.0 
Head count index 
Rural 67.8 2.6 
National 25.1 1.4 
Banjul+ Kanifing 12.7 1.7 
Other urban 21.1 3.0 
Poverty gap 
Rural 30.5 2.0 
National 13.9 1.1 
Banjul+ Kanifing 6.1 1.0 
Other urban 10.8 2.0 
Poverty severity 
Rural 17.4 1.6 
Note: Based on upper poverty line. 
Source: GBOS, 2007. 
TABLE A3 
Basic Employment Indicators: Various Strata, Population Census 2003 
 
Labour force  
participation rate Employment rate Unemployment rate 
Urban  45% 40% 10% 
Rural 54% 53% 2% 
Male 53% 52% 6% 
Female 46% 41% 6% 
15-24 40% 35% 12% 
20-24 54% 47% 13% 
25-49 77% 73% 5% 
50-64 80% 78% 2% 
65+ 63% 62% 2% 
Literate 41% 39% 7% 
Illiterate 66% 63% 5% 
Total Gambia 48% 45% 6% 
Note: These data exclude people aged 0-6. Labour force participation rate= ratio economically active / relevant group; 
Employment rate = employed / total population in relevant group; Unemployment rate = unemployed / active. 
Source: Authors calculations from Population Census 2003  
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Table A4 
Components of Value Added by Industry, 2004 
 Compensation  
 of Employees  
  Depreciation  
 Taxes Less  
 Subsidies  
 Operating  
 Surplus  
 Value  
 Added  Industry  
Per cent 
  Agriculture   11.0 4.4 1.6 83.1 100 
  Fishing   14.5 6.3 2.6 76.6 100 
  Mining and Quarrying   N\A N\A N\A N\A 100 
 Manufacturing  20.5 12.7 8.6 58.2 100 
  Utilities   37.3 33.0 8.0 21.7 100 
  Building and Construction   26.6 15.4 14.0 44.0 100 
 Trade  14.2 7.7 9.3 68.9 100 
 Hotels and Restaurants  23.7 16.8 10.3 49.2 100 
 Transport and Storage  15.8 16.2 12.6 55.4 100 
 Posts and 
Telecommunications  
17.8 12.2 11.7 58.3 100 
 Finance and Insurance  18.2 14.0 12.5 55.2 100 
 Real Estate and Business 
Services  
12.6 5.8 9.8 71.8 100 
 Education  65.6 1.7 -31.8 64.5 100 
 Health and Social Work  30.8 6.7 -20.0 82.5 100 
 Community, Social and 
Personal Services  
11.8 5.3 6.8 76.1 100 
 Total  18.4 11.3 8.8 61.5 100 
Source: Economic Census 2004. 
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TABLE A5 
Sectoral Distribution of Employment and Economic Activity: Firms, Employment,  
Gross Compensation, Earnings Per Worker, Output, and Value Added, The Gambia, 2004 
Industry  Establishments   Employment  
 Compensation 
of Employees 
D'000 
Earnings per 
employee 
(annual average)
Gross Output 
Dalasis  
(D '000) 
Value Added 
Dalasis (D '000) 
Market Gardening and 
Horticulture 4,675 12,243 9,865 806 602,329 321,041 
Fishing 1,500 4,462 113,570 25,453 1,114,535 783,243 
Mining and Quarrying 66 102 ----         ---- 332,840 266,938 
Manufacturing 9,053 34,694 166,863 4,810 1,600,491 813,189 
Utilities 1 900 51,578 57,309 543,511 138,529 
Building and Construction 717 4,544 261,456 57,539 1,616,945 982,178 
Trade 56,549 114,486 574,755 5,020 7,050,116 4,055,119 
Hotels and Restaurants 1,122 9,167 255,805 27,905 1,638,478 1,078,070 
Transport 4,235 14,356 244,000 16,996 2,279,786 1,546,790 
Posts and 
Telecommunications 3,885 7211 194,804 27,015 1,654,582 1,096,420 
Finance and Insurance 99 1,854 192,229 103,683 1,414,595 1,053,555 
Real Estate and  
Business Services 530 2,689 39,194 14,576 429,844 311,060 
Education 1,276 10,087 91,346 9,056 191,003 131,486 
Health and Social Work 226 3,826 132,821 34,715 641,398 327,570 
Community and  
Personal Services 1,379 2,989 41,826 13,993 507,820 354,458 
Total 85,313 223,610 2,370,112 10,599 21,618,273 13,259,646 
Note: Excludes government, imputed rent and crop growing. 
Source: Authors calculations from Economic Census dataset. 
TABLE A6A 
Top 10 Occupations of Employed Population (Overall) 
  Male Female Total numbers In %  of total Cumulative % 
1 Crop growers          95,749         147,253         243,002  50.0% 50.0% 
2 Stall market seller         11,978           13,906           25,884  5.3% 55.4% 
3 Frame building (builder)         22,464                398           22,862  4.7% 60.1% 
4 Sales persons         15,424             5,332           20,756  4.3% 64.3% 
5 Street vendor           6,282           13,655           19,937  4.1% 68.4% 
6 Vehicle driver         16,822                220           17,042  3.5% 71.9% 
7 Domestic cleaner           1,857           13,526           15,383  3.2% 75.1% 
8 Textile worker           8,050             2,152           10,202  2.1% 77.2% 
9 Protection services           6,729                677             7,406  1.5% 78.7% 
10 House keeping           3,310             3,796             7,106  1.5% 80.2% 
Source: Authors calculations from Population Census 2003. 
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TABLE A6B 
Top 10 Occupations of Employed Population (Male) 
  Male Female Total numbers In % of total Cumulative % 
1 Crop growers       95,749        147,253        243,002  36.1% 36.1% 
2 Frame building (builder)       22,464              398         22,862  8.5% 44.6% 
3 Vehicle driver       16,822              220         17,042  6.3% 50.9% 
4 Sales persons       15,424           5,332         20,756  5.8% 56.7% 
5 Stall market seller       11,978         13,906         25,884  4.5% 61.3% 
6 Textile worker        8,050           2,152         10,202  3.0% 64.3% 
7 Protection services        6,729              677           7,406  2.5% 66.8% 
8 Street vendor        6,282         13,655         19,937  2.4% 69.2% 
9 Fishery         5,424              628           6,052  2.1% 71.2% 
10 Mechanic        5,150                95           5,245  1.9% 73.2% 
Source: Authors calculations from Population Census 2003. 
TABLE A6C 
Top 10 Occupations of Employed Population (Female) 
  Male Female Total numbers In % of total Cumulative % 
1 Crop growers        95,749         147,253         243,002  66.8% 66.8% 
2 Stall market seller        11,978           13,906           25,884  6.3% 73.1% 
3 Street vendor          6,282           13,655           19,937  6.2% 79.3% 
4 Domestic cleaner          1,857           13,526           15,383  6.1% 85.4% 
5 Sales persons        15,424             5,332           20,756  2.4% 87.8% 
6 House keeping          3,310             3,796             7,106  1.7% 89.5% 
7 Textile worker          8,050             2,152           10,202  1.0% 90.5% 
8 Secretaries              599             1,754             2,353  0.8% 91.3% 
9 Food processing          3,479             1,479             4,958  0.7% 92.0% 
10 
Primary education 
(teacher)          2,567             1,296             3,863  0.6% 92.6% 
Source: Authors calculations from Population Census 2003. 
TABLE A7 
Training Received, Total Labour Force Disaggregated by Sex, 2006 
  Men Women All 
1 Tailoring/sewing/designing 3.3% 4.0% 3.7% 
2 Gardening/farming 2.3% 3.7% 3.1% 
3 Computing 2.2% 3.2% 2.7% 
4 Driving 4.8% 0.1% 2.4% 
5 Carpentry 4.6% 0.1% 2.3% 
6 Soap making 0.1% 4.3% 2.2% 
7 Trading 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 
8 Teaching 2.9% 1.3% 2.1% 
9 Tie & dye 0.2% 2.7% 1.5% 
10 Mechanic 2.7% 0.0% 1.3% 
11 Construction 2.4% 0.2% 1.3% 
12 Accountancy 1.4% 1.0% 1.2% 
13 Electrician 2.1% 0.1% 1.0% 
14 Business (management) 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
15 Masonry 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
 No training received 45.5% 61.4% 53.7% 
Source: NTA (2006). 
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TABLE A8 
Distribution of Economically Active and Employed by Industry and Sex, 2003 
Economically Active Employed Industry Economically Active Employed 
Per cent of employed 
by sector Male Female Male Female 
Agric. & Animal 242,326 241,727 50.1% 98,101 144,225 97,798 143,929 
Fisheries 6,780 6,778 1.4% 5,668 1,112 5,667 1,111 
Manufacturing 24,635 24,580 5.1% 19,199 5,436 19,153 5,427 
Electricity, 11,355 11,317 2.3% 10,984 371 10,948 369 
Construction 18,983 18,929 3.9% 18,584 399 18,530 399 
Trade 74,626 74,495 15.4% 42,096 32,530 42,027 32,468 
Hotels & Rest 10,208 10,155 2.1% 5,989 4,219 5,964 4,191 
Transport 24,125 24,030 5.0% 22,448 1,677 22,362 1,668 
Financial 7,431 7,415 1.5% 5,450 1,981 5,440 1,975 
Community and 
social services 59,820 59,627 12.4% 35,908 23,912 35,818 23,809 
Not Stated 33,121 3,386 0.7% 18,013 15,108 1,683 1,703 
Total 513,410 482,439 100% 282,440 230,970 265,390 217,049 
Source: Author calculations from Population Census 2003. 
 
TABLE A9 
Number of Schools Nationwide by Level, 1999-2004 
 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Lower Basic 346 348 
Upper Basic 86 97 
Senior Secondary 25 49 
Total 457 557 
Source: Gambian authorities. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Estimates of the size of the Gambian labour force over time are used to derive estimates of the level of  
employment for a particular unemployment rate. 
2. Employment data from 2003 Census. GDP data from the Central Bank of The Gambia. 
3. See also World Bank and Government of The Gambia (2006). 
4. For early growth trends see the discussions in McPherson and Radelet (1995). 
5. Data from the Central Bank of The Gambia, the IMF (International Financial Statistics), and the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) show a persistent current account deficit (before official ODA transfers) over time. 
6. The correlation coefficient between the annual growth rate of M1 and the growth rate of broad money is 0.67. 
7. The correlation coefficient between the inflation rate and the growth of broad money for  
the period 1971-2005 is 0.06 – nearly zero. 
8. According to the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, this D 93 million in credit amounts to only 4.2 per cent  
of total credit extended to the private sector. 
9. In 1985, The Gambia implemented a wide range of reforms as part of a program of structural adjustment and 
economic liberalization, called The Economic Recovery Program. See essays in McPherson and Radelet (1995). 
10. In the past, countries have attempted to improve their external balance through an import-substitution 
industrialization strategy, in which efforts were made to decrease reliance on imported goods (through tariff protections 
and other measures). However, dependence on imported inputs, raw materials, energy, and capital goods often 
remained. Because of this, many countries tended to maintain a strong real exchange rate to reduce the price of 
imported inputs. This constrained access to global markets and placed constraints on the process of industrialization, 
which had to depend on the domestic market alone. Such an approach would be particularly problematic for The 
Gambia because of its small domestic market. However, the objectives of the import substitution approach, if not its 
methods, remain valid: encourage domestic industrial development and a more favourable external balance. 
11. Estimates from the balance of payments statistics, Central Bank of The Gambia. 
12. Budget data on the financing of the expenditure gap were taken from the Central Bank of The Gambia. 
13. The recently formed Monetary Policy Committee is composed of staff from the Central Bank (monetary policy) and 
the Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs (fiscal policy). 
14. This association also occurs because it is assumed that there are no economies of scale in household consumption. 
This assumption is, of course, questionable. See, for example, Deaton and Paxson (1998) and Lanjow and Ravallion (1995).  
15. This rate may seem low and at odds with current perceptions that unemployment is very serious in The Gambia. 
However, this estimate is perfectly consistent with the definitions and data collection methods used in the Census. Any 
form of economic activity, including own-account farming is considered “employment” regardless of its seasonality and 
frequency. Thus, in reality the unemployment rate may not be a useful indicator of inadequate demand for labour in a 
country where employment is dominated by agricultural and informal employment. 
16. The National Employment Action Plan (2001) quotes a figure of 28 per cent for urban youth unemployment. Either 
rate, a 22 or 28 per cent, poses a significant challenge to policy makers. The National Employment Policy (NEP, 2001) 
provides very little empirical evidence on measured rates of unemployment. The NEP states that The Gambia has  
“an open unemployment level (sic) of 26% (with significant variations in age, gender and geographical location)” (p. 2) 
which is nearly identical to the unemployment rate quoted for the subset of the population aged 20-24 years old (28 
percent). This suggests that the reported estimates may be inconsistent. Unfortunately, the NEP provides no reference for 
the source of these estimates. 
17. These results should be interpreted with caution as they are based on limited sample of the employed people.  
18. A micro-level study in peri-urban areas of Banjul also showed that most individuals involved in non-farm wage 
employment were employed for almost the entire year (Roth et al. 1996). The same report shows that many self-
employed activities display a more marked seasonal or irregular character. 
19. This suggests that a large proportion of the totally recorded wage employment (107,754 from the population census 
2003) is registered in the SSHFC. Given the high degree of “informality” shown by the results of the Economic Census 
these data from the SSHFC is rather surprising and puzzling. The IMF estimated only 37,461 wage employees in 1998.  
As employment has not increased so rapidly, SSFHC figures seem inconsistent with the other sources. 
20. Monthly average earnings of a hotel worker including tips have been estimated at 5,000D; even for a half-year job, 
that would imply an annual wage of D30,000 wage (Mitchell and Faal, 2006).  
21. These data were collected by the recent NTA survey. See also NTA (2006). 
22. Madrassas and daaras are Islamic/Koranic religious schools, “daara” being the Wolof word commonly used in  
Senegal and The Gambia. 
23. The areas of training reported in the NTA survey to an extent reflect the main areas of actual and potential 
employment according to respondents’ perceptions. These are areas where various state and non-state actors have 
invested resources in training. 
24. Women’s higher level of education in formal paid employment may be a result of existing labour market barriers and 
gender segmentation. If women face more stringent barriers to certain forms of employment, the few women who end 
up working in these jobs may have better qualifications on average than would be the case for men (on average). 
25. Migration from rural areas, especially among the youth, is not per se a very alarming development so long as this is 
not simply a result of “push” factors (i.e., agrarian crisis or stagnation) but also of “pull” factors (i.e., better remunerated 
 
 
and stable job opportunities in urban areas). However, high and rising urban poverty rates suggest that push factors have 
prevailed over pull factors in the last decade. 
26. Most available evidence would suggest that the bulk of remittances come from the overseas diaspora in Europe or 
the USA. However, it is also possible that evidence on internal remittances has not been sufficiently well recorded. 
27. According to The Gambia Port Authority sources this segment of their workforce is actually oversized given changes 
in port management and technology. 
28. See also Government of the Gambia (2006, p. 54) and World Bank (2005). 
29. This is also clearly highlighted by the PRSP II (2006, p. 32), which presents the paradox of graduate unemployment 
with some vacancies in the public sector, quoting the low salaries as a possible cause. 
30. See also IMF 2006, p. 16. IMF figures show greater wage compression than those figures obtained from the SSHFC 
register. According to the IMF data, the public sector wage scale ranged from a minimum of 7,511 to a maximum of 
54,707, in terms of basic pay. The revised scale in 2006 shows a much wider range from lower to upper bounds. 
31. This includes the so-called “subvention bodies” such as GTTI, the Gambia College, the Farafenni Hospital, and others. 
32. An alternative solution consistent with this trend would be to reform the curriculum in order to reduce the mismatch 
between skills acquired in secondary level and skills demanded by the labour market. Currently, educational curricula at 
all levels are being reviewed and structured in line with the country’s development needs. Skills courses and courses for 
the professions in commerce are now an integral part of the curricula of all schools from the upper basic to the senior 
secondary level. However, the NTA results suggest that there is still a long road ahead in this matter.  
33. The report documents the large presence of Senegalese fishermen operating in the Atlantic coast, north and south of 
Banjul. The estimates suggest that up to 60% of fishermen in the area are foreign-born, mainly from Senegal but also 
from Ghana. River fishing, on the contrary, is clearly dominated by local fishermen but in terms of catches is less 
important than ocean fishing. 
34. Although information on minimum wages for various categories of workers was published in a recent IMF report  
(IMF 2006), most respondents in the Department of Labour were unable to provide such information and seemed  
not to know all the various levels of minimum wage according to category.  
35. This information was obtained in an interview with a major construction operator and his supervisors in The Gambia 
as well as with other key informants from the NTA. The wage rate quoted referred to the work of unskilled construction 
workers with simple tasks (e.g., offloading trucks, preparing cement, etc.)  
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